| This dissertation both surveys contemporary work in metanormativity and argues for a position that I call moderate normative skepticism. I begin by evaluating efforts to characterize the normative domain and conclude that while some normative concepts and properties are amenable to naturalistic programs of reduction and analysis, other normative concepts and properties are not. I proceed to clarify accounts of reasons, reasoning, and rationality; this establishes argumentative room to maneuver for my moderate normative skepticism. Next, I evaluate moral error theories, which I count as close cousins of my own thesis, and I note how these error theories have more profound implications than their authors realize. I claim that, understood properly, these error theories extend to the domain of normative reasons in general. I accept and defend the extension of error theory as a viable position. In the final chapter of my dissertation, I defend my position against charges of self-defeat and attempt to anticipate and defuse potential criticisms. |
