Negotiating with the hermit kingdom: Frames and preferences in the Korean nuclear dilemma

This thesis explores the nonproliferation negotiations surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea; DPRK). The thesis asks: why has the current round of negotiations so far failed to make progress? Two primary areas of interest are identified: the link between player negotiation preferences and their greater geopolitical interests (regional preferences); and the affect of those regional preferences on the negotiations format. A chronological account of the DPRK's nuclear programme is presented that divides the negotiations into a bilateral period and a multilateral period. The preferences of each player in either period are assessed, with close attention paid to how they frame the nuclear dispute in terms of issue linkages, strategies, and interpretations of North Korea's own ambitions. The resulting framing differences between each player are juxtaposed to reveal that regional preferences have a large effect on negotiation strategies, to the extent where the benefits of a multilateral negotiation format can be (as has been the case) outweighed by regionally-driven differences in framing and strategy.