| Conceptual atomism, as first espoused by Jerry Fodor, asserts that many of our ordinary non-scientific concepts lack constituent structure. This radical theory challenges a central assumption embraced by many theorists of concepts, namely, that possessing a concept is constituted by a person having certain beliefs or being disposed to draw certain inferences. My dissertation examines the strengths and weaknesses of Fodor's original theory and argues that conceptual atomism in a revised form is the only viable theory of concepts.;Conceptual atomism, I submit, is the only, serious contender. However, due to some of its counter-intuitive implications and its sometimes obscure formulation, it has not gained much of a reception among theorists in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. Yet, conceptual atomism can be reconfigured beyond Fodor's original thesis to become a more satisfactory theory capable of dispelling objections that have been raised, such as the possibility of punctate minds, explanatory impotence, and 'mad dog' nativism (Chapter 3).;In light of the arguments presented here, concept possession cannot be an epistemic matter because concept possession is not constituted by having certain beliefs or being disposed to make certain inferences. My strategy is to critique an exhaustive list of epistemic theories that postulate a conception as (1) explicitly or implicitly known, (2) true or false, and/or (3) complete or incomplete (Chapter 4). I demonstrate that none of these conditions is necessary for possessing a concept; I argue instead that concept possession is best thought of as constituted by a person possessing the relevant mental representation. Conceptual atomism in its revised form is indeed full of philosophical and theoretical possibilities (Conclusion).;After reviewing pertinent aspects of the study of the theory of concepts (Chapter 1), I establish that many theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences are inadequate. In particular, the 'theory-theory', the latest theory of concepts in cognitive psychology, is flawed (Chapter 2). Insofar as this theory is intended to replace earlier theories, its own failure signals the need for another approach. |
