Bicameralism and the politics of campaign finance reform

Following scholarship on the economic theory of regulation, I offer an institutional explanation for the failure to pass significant campaign finance reform. Reform has suffered at the hands of institutional structure ideology, and partisanship. My hypotheses rest on an understanding of electorally minded members of Congress whose preferences are shaped by the bicameral structure of the legislature.; Money has always played a complex role in American electoral politics, and rarely have the players agreed on its propriety. In spite of endless dialogue on the need for reform, American Congressional candidates have never had more regulation regarding money in politics than they currently have. Until the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) and the 1974 FECA Amendments, candidates were relatively free to spend and receive without the watchful eye of the government,1 public interest groups or the media. This was part of the impetus for reform. But Buckley v. Valeo (1976) preempted any chance that full spectrum regulation might actually stem the torrent of abuses in campaigns, resulting in a system of limited supply and unlimited demand. Thus contributors who are legally restricted have found ways to channel funds to candidates. The sums that flow through these loopholes far exceed the ceilings established by law, and raise questions regarding their legality. Efforts toward further regulation have failed in the face of bicameral and partisan politics.; Using Federal Election Commission data on candidate contributions from 1980 through 1998, I find that Representatives receive contributions from various sources in different amounts and percentages than Senators. Combining insights gleaned from the campaign data, utilizing an original data set of campaign finance reform measures proposed in the House and Senate from the ninety-seventh congress through the one hundred and sixth congress I test the hypothesis that bicameralism has influenced members' support for reform.; The models support my hypothesis, demonstrating a significant difference in support from Representatives and Senators on reform measures, controlling for party and ideology. The implications for this study demonstrate the contentious nature of bicameral politics in the United States Congress and raise questions for the possibilities of future attempts at reform.; 1Existing law had no enforcement provisions.