The behavior of East European Armed Forces during the crises of the communist order, 1955--1989

During crises of the communist order, the East European Armed Forces displayed behaviors that varied across the region and in time. The armed forces participated directly or indirectly in the violent repression of civilians, abstained from involvement in regime transitions, remained passive in the face of violence against civilians, or colluded with demonstrators against the Communist regime. Behavior towards the Soviet Union varied from overt resistance to passivity to coordination of efforts to attain common goals. Military behavior towards the domestic Communist leadership during regime crises also varied in time and across the region from compliance to passivity to opposition.; My thesis argues that the EEAFs' behavior during crises is best understood if, rather than considering them as subjects of an asymmetric dependence relationship with Communist parties and the USSR, we think of them as institutions, which acted to insure their survival and maximize their autonomy, resources, reputation and prestige, given the potential benefits of desired states of affairs and the penalties other actors were likely to exact.; The armed forces' choice of behavior during crises was affected by the crisis-specific configuration of constraints introduced by participating actors with direct bearing on the armed forces' institutional interests: the USSR, the Party, and the mobilized social groups. The constraints these actors imposed on the EEAFs' actions were perceived as expected rewards and penalties/costs, and depended on Soviet commitment to support communist order in Eastern Europe, Party leadership, and societal mobilization. For each such configuration, EEAFs chose a behavior that is explained by a classical utility function.