United States riverine warfare in Vietnam: A critical analysis of strategy

This thesis examines the Naval Riverine Warfare Strategy in the Delta during the Vietnam War. A theoretical framework is developed using limited war theory and the strategy-policy-campaign planning process. The focus of the study is to analyze the naval campaign within the policy-strategy-planning framework of limited war. The naval operations and strategy are evaluated for effectiveness both individually and within a larger theater context. The study looks at the links between policy, strategy and planning as well as the political restrictions placed on the military to explain the campaign effectiveness.;All naval operations were found to be tactically effective by virtually any measure. However, the initial operations produced no meaningful strategic results. This was directly related to broken linkages between the military strategy and the planning process. The follow-on "Sea Lords" Campaign integrated the original naval operations and produced strategically meaningful results; but, results still fell short of expectations because the efforts of the U.S. Army, the Vietnamese Army and pacification programs were not coordinated. Lack of coordination allowed the Viet Cong to adapt to and circumvent U.S. tactics and strategy. Moreover, political restrictions placed on the military which prevented attacking the Viet Cong logistics network and sanctuaries made it nearly impossible for the riverine forces to stop the Viet Cong in the Delta.;The study makes several recommendations to improve the military utility in a limited war environment. These include a closer cooperation between the civilian leaders and the military in establishing solid policy-strategy linkages by identifying and agreeing on the specific strategic and military objectives as well as prudent military restrictions to satisfy policy concerns. Additionally, the coordination between the military and other non-military actors must be coordinated within a larger campaign plan to fuse the efforts of each into a cohesive plan. Tactical success for each individual operation is only relevant within the larger context of the campaign. When policy goals are very limited in nature, the military element must be closely coordinated with the other elements of national power and non-military actors to achieve these desired goals.