| This dissertation has several key components. First, I argue that the dispositional model of aesthetic properties is the most viable form of aesthetic realism. I explain that it is able to effectively balance the subjective and objective characteristics of aesthetic properties. I go on to argue that the most naturalistically viable form of dispositionalism is perceptual objectivism. Next, I synthesize the work of Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson and develop a fuller account of perceptual objectivism.;In chapter 2, I argue that perceptual objectivism has two crucial features: (1) a dispositional realist model of aesthetic properties (which I call the perceptual model) and (2) the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties. The descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties is the most controversial---and the most important---part of perceptual objectivism. Because of this, the bulk of the dissertation is devoted to defending the descriptive account from a philosophical and an empirical perspective.;It is fairly unusual to treat aesthetic properties as fundamentally descriptive; indeed, it is why perceptual objectivism might be considered a revisionist theory of aesthetic properties. A key component of this view is something I call the separability thesis. The thesis contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the aesthetic property. As I outline in chapter 5, garishness is a good case study. The descriptive content creates the boundary of the concept. Many would agree that garishness is an unpleasant feature of an object. A garish carpet, for example, might cause one to experience genuine aesthetic displeasure. This displeasure, however, does not constitute the property. A 'garish' object is characterized by bright, clashing colors. The fact that we can consistently apply and understand 'garish' suggests that there is some kind of common perceptual content associated with an experience of the property. This common perceptual content also explains how an artist can intentionally manipulate a medium to create certain aesthetic effects.;Two aspects of the view loom large in criticism: 1) the separability thesis (described above) and 2) the empirical viability of higher-order aesthetic perception. In chapter 3, I respond to several potent challenges to the separability thesis. In chapter 4, I address 2) by taking an extensive look at empirical aesthetics. I analyze one case in particular, amusia, which offers possible empirical support for the perceptual objectivist analysis of aesthetic experience. Finally, in chapter 5 I draw on the philosophy of perception to defend the perceptual model of aesthetic experience. A fully developed account of perceptual objectivism offers philosophers a naturalistically viable form of aesthetic realism and opens up new possibilities for research in meta-aesthetics. |
