| This thesis addresses the topic of United States aid policies toward North and South Vietnam during the principal years of U.S. involvement (1965-1975), and it is considered within the context of the Cold War. The emphasis of this study is an analysis of the failures of the Johnson and Nixon presidential administrations in their attempts to bring North Vietnamese leadership to a mutually acceptable bargaining position, which would allow the existence of the sovereign nation of South Vietnam. Both Johnson and Nixon believed they could find the right "carrot" (aid promises) and "stick" (combat escalation) to bring Hanoi to terms. This paper will show this assumption to have been futile, because of the North Vietnamese commitment to the long-term goal of reunification.;The thesis examines relevant issues which emanated from the Paris Peace Accords, including several controversies, and concludes with a brief summary of where the aid issue stands today, the status of the related POW/MIA situation, and the current prospect of the U.S. and Vietnam reestablishing economic and diplomatic relations. |
