| The relevance of the Socratic dictum to moral education is captured in John Dewey's judgment that the most important problem of moral education concerns the relationship between knowledge and conduct. What makes this relationship a problem is the possibility of a rupture between thought and action--what has been termed moral incontinence: one knowing that he is morally obligated to do X and yet either freely not doing X or doing Y (which he knows he morally ought not to do). Common sense exhibits no doubt that moral incontinence occurs quite frequently. If such a verdict were true, however, it would contribute substantially towards diminishing the possible value and efficacy of moral education.; Buttressing the belief in the frequent occurrence of moral incontinence is a faculty model of man which separates the intellect, the will and the appetite. Throughout this dissertation the faculty model of man is criticized in general, and in particular, is faulted for misconceiving the relationship between desires or emotions and rational beliefs.; After an introductory chapter which describes the nature and complexity of the problem of moral incontinence, there is a chapter (II) which details and analyzes the various existing moral education programs in terms of how each addresses the possibility of moral incontinence. Chapter III is devoted to refuting the thesis that cases of moral incontinence are instances of psychological inability to act out one's rational judgments. The next three chapters deal with the central issue of the relationships between knowledge and obligation, knowledge and motivation, and obligation and motivation. Specifically, Chapter IV argues that in order for a moral obligation to become a rationally motivated action, the agent must accept the moral status of the proposed action. Furthermore, since ought implies can, no action has the status of being obligatory unless it can in fact be enacted. These two insights are used to discredit the popular interpretation of moral incontinence as instances of "ought but can't." Chapter V shows that the ordinary understanding of motives is such that they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for actions. This faulty understanding is corrected by replacing the common static notion of motive with an active notion of having a motive. Having a motive is characterized not only as having a reason for and desire to act a certain way, but also as being committed to that action. Given this more intelligible concept of motive, it is concluded that there is no possibility for a rupture between knowing that X ought to be done, having a motive for doing X, and doing X. Chapter VI addresses the issue of whether a motive is external or internal to the acceptance of a moral obligation. An analysis of this issue yields the realization that the real dispute is over different interpretations of what it means to accept an act as morally obligatory, as well as over different interpretation of what it means to act obligatorily. Based on the formulation of having a motive that was detailed in Chapter V, it is concluded that motives are internal to the acceptance of a moral obligation, and therefore, there cannot be any instances of a rupture between the acceptance of a moral obligation and having a motive to act accordingly. The final chapter (VII) offers a general conclusion as to how and why moral incontinence is not a possible threat to the efficacy of a rationally based moral education program. To the extent that this conclusion is justified, it is taken that the Socratic dictum has been vindicated. |
