| This thesis addresses issues in supply chain management through cooperative and non-cooperative game theory models. It is composed of three essays. The first essay aims to understand how competition in supply chains would impact joint selling partnerships among complementary component suppliers. It models competition from two perspectives: brand competition generated from the existence of multiple partially substitutable brands (or suppliers) for a particular component, and retail competition caused by decentralization among retailers who assemble suppliers' components into final products and sell them to customers. The second essay studies how the durability of the end product and the purchasing behavior of end consumers, in terms of consumer's forward looking behavior and patience, affect the alliance decisions of complementary firms. It also comments on how results are affected by scenarios like manufacturers directly selling to the end consumers or them having multiple alliance formation opportunities. The third essay employs a bargaining framework to investigate a manufacturer's preference over its retailers' market composition within a supply chain. In addition, it also aims to understand how such business relationships are influenced by the bargaining approach, dominant retailer and competition from other supply chains providing similar competitive products. |
