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Analysis And Countermeasures Of Cold Chain Logistics Epidemic Prevention And Control Based On Evolutionary Game

Posted on:2022-11-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2480306743973419Subject:Logistics Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020 quickly became a major public health emergency with the widest range of infections,the most difficult prevention and control,and the fastest speed of infection since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.Cold chain logistics epidemic prevention and control involves the participation of multiple stakeholders such as the government,cold chain platforms,cold chain logistics companies,fresh market sellers,and consumers.At the same time,different subjects also have different demands for expected benefits.With the goal of maximizing their own interests as development goal,there are often conflicts of interests among subjects,which may lead to problems such as low enthusiasm for supervision and unimplemented epidemic prevention measures,and trigger the risk of cold chain logistics epidemic spread.Therefore,it is of great security significance to explore the strategic choice and influencing factors among cold chain logistics participants in the context of epidemic prevention and control.Based on the literature review and analysis of cold chain logistics epidemic events,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for cold chain logistics epidemic prevention and control.The government,cold chain platforms,and cold chain logistics companies are selected as the three main entities of cold chain logistics epidemic prevention and control to establish payment income matrices of different entities,and analyze the stability of the behavior selection strategy of game players.The dynamic equation is brought into the system dynamics Vensim software to simulate the game process and strategic behavior,and further explore the influence of exogenous variables that promote the change of the participant’s strategic behavior.Based on this,the paper also provides feasible behavior countermeasures for different participants.The conclusions are as follows:(1)The stability of cold chain logistics epidemic prevention and control is under the combined effect of the different behavioral strategies of the three parties.The behavior choice of a single subject not only affects its own behavior strategy,but also has a certain degree of interactive influence on the future behavior choice of other subjects.(2)Three participants in the cold chain logistics epidemic prevention and control system: the government,cold chain platforms,cold chain logistics enterprises,and the active participation of each party is conducive to promoting the safety and stability of cold chain prevention and control.Regardless of the initial state,as time goes by,the government,cold chain platform and cold chain logistics enterprises will all choose active strategies,and the system will eventually dynamically evolve into a stable state of(1,1,1),and the cold chain safety prevention and control system will achieve strong stability.(3)In the cold chain safety system,each subject is highly sensitive to its own related exogenous variables,and the stability of the system depends on the joint action of related variables of each subject.The leading role of the government should be given full play and various measures should be taken to stimulate the enthusiasm of the participants.Based on the above research conclusions,corresponding behavioral countermeasures and suggestions for the government,cold chain platform and cold chain logistics enterprises are provided to ensure the rights and interests of all parties and improve the level of cold chain logistics epidemic prevention and control.
Keywords/Search Tags:Cold Chain Logistics, Epidemic Prevention and Control, Evolutionary Game, Simulation Analysis, Behavioral Strategy
PDF Full Text Request
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