An Evolutionary Game Study On The Quality Investment Of Cold Chain Under Government Supervision

With the development of china's economy and the improvement of the material level,people's requirement for fresh food have changed from the demand of quantity to the pursuit of quality.The demand for cold-stored drugs at low temperature storage has been increasing.But in recent years,the circulation of fresh food has been seriously depleted.Cold-stored drug safety incidents are frequent.To address this issue,cold-chain-node enterprises should strengthen resource input to ensure the quality of the cold chain.The method of evolutionary game is adopted to study the quality investment of cold chain,constructing an evolutionary game model of cold chain quality input of suppliers and processors under the participation of no government,and carrying out solution analysis.The analysis results show that the choice of cold chain quality investment strategies of suppliers and processors is closely related to the benefits of their respective inputs.When the quality inputs and outputs of the two parties are changing constantly,multiple evolutionary stability strategies can be obtained.On this basis,aiming at the problem of “free-rider” brought about by the quality investment of cold chain,an evolutionary game model of suppliers and processors on the cold chain under “punishment and contract mechanism” is constructed to analyze the behavioral strategies of both parties and perform model simulation.Quantitatively determine the effective scope of the government's punishment,while reducing government supervision costs.For the benefits of quality investment for node companies on the cold chain are less than the cost,the government should adopt a subsidy mechanism to encourage suppliers and processors to invest in the quality of the cold chain.An evolutionary game model under the same subsidy quota mechanism is built,and the effective scope of the subsidy is obtained by solving the model,and the model is simulated and analyzed.Considering that in reality the operation status of suppliers and processors is different and the amount of subsidies required is also different.In order to arrive at a more appropriate subsidy,an evolutionary game model under different subsidies is constructed,to obtain specific and effective scope of subsidies for suppliers and processors respectively.Finally,aiming at the game of quality investment among similar cold-chain node enterprises,taking suppliers as an example,in order to encourage them to invest in the quality of cold chain,it will punish the behavior of free-rider and the subsidize behavior of quality investment.Constructed the evolutionary game model between supplier group under the supervision of the government,and to solve the analysis.And measures are taken to promote its quality investment and ensure the safety of fresh food and refrigerated drugs on the cold chain.It provides a theoretical reference for the supervision of relevant government departments,and the logistics operation of food and pharmaceutical cold chain node enterprises,to provide help for the faster and better development of China's cold chain logistics in the future.