Research On The Game In The Implementation Of "One Size Fits All" Environmental Policy

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,my country’s ecological civilization construction has achieved historic results.However,environmental issues still cannot be ignored.The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that pollution prevention is one of the important contents of the "three tough battles." In the past two years,as the central government’s environmental inspection work has continued to deepen,some local governments have adopted simple and rude “one size fits all” practices in the course of policy implementation and have gradually been exposed to the public.The "one size fits all" use of coercive means to cover up related issues not only violates the original intention of the central environmental governance and inspection,but also brings huge losses to people’s production and life.Under heavy pressure,why has the "one size fits all" been repeatedly banned? The wave of central environmental inspections provides us with a very good opportunity to study the "one size fits all" behavior of local governments,and it also provides an opportunity to test the application of game theory to the behavior of Chinese environmental stakeholders.Based on this,this article first summarizes the research results of domestic and foreign scholars on policy implementation.After explaining related concepts,combining game theory and intergovernmental relationship theories,starting from the level of the executive body and the target group,the game analysis framework is proposed and selected The “one size fits all”case of Taiyuan City,Shanxi Province,through field and telephone interviews and investigations,the process of tracking and analysis of the case,in order to conduct a detailed exploration of the game in the implementation of environmental protection policies.The article found that in the process of implementing the “one size fits all”environmental protection policy,first of all,starting from the implementation subject level,due to the information asymmetry between the central and local governments,coupled with the self-interested tendency of the local governments,there is a dynamic repeated game relationship between the two.Both the central government’s supervision and the legitimacy of environmental protection policies will affect the implementation strategies and effects of local governments.There is also a game among local governments.From a vertical perspective,local governments obtain the attention of higher-level governments through competition;from a horizontal perspective,driven by political tournaments,local governments at the same administrative level will compete in competition.After weighing the benefits and losses,follow the "one size fits all" behavior of the "acquiescence" of the higher-level government.Secondly,from the perspective of the executive body and the target group,there is a game between the local government and the people.When local governments adopt "one size fits all" in order to complete the assessment indicators,the people will also adopt the methods of "resisting in accordance with the law" and "daily resistance" to protect their rights.Finally,this article proposes corresponding policy recommendations based on this: starting from the government level,we must establish a correct performance concept,diligently investigate and practice;improve the hierarchical supervision system,and increase accountability;from the public level,we must play the role of social supervision and make good use of reports.Mechanism;change purchase and consumption behavior,improve environmental protection awareness,etc.