| At present,the development of the renewable energy industry has become a key support for my country’s response to climate change and the acceleration of energy low-carbon transformation.Renewable energy power generation,grid connection and grid consumption are key factors restricting the development of the renewable energy industry.In order to eliminate development barriers,my country has implemented an institutional change from a feed-in tariff policy to Renewable Portfolio Standards.The implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards can give play to the function of optimizing resource allocation in the green certificate market,optimize the energy consumption and supply structure in China,and finally promote the development of the renewable energy industry.Based on the above-mentioned institutional background,this paper studies the impact of the limited rational power generation companies’ strategy learning behavior on the economic performance under Renewable Portfolio Standards.Firstly,it discusses the operating mechanism of Renewable Portfolio Standards and the game learning behavior of power producers with bounded rationality;secondly,it analyzes the influence path of Renewable Portfolio Standards on the learning behavior of power producers and the evolution mechanism of the learning behavior of power producers;finally,the dynamic game model of the output of the power producer under Renewable Portfolio Standards is constructed and the simulation analysis is carried out by using MATLAB software.The results show that:(1)The introduction of Renewable Portfolio Standards changes the income structure of power generation companies,thus changing their decision-making environment.Under the new revenue structure,in order to achieve the goal of profit maximization,the bounded rational power plant will choose the strategy learning behavior,that is,by dynamically adjusting its strategy to make it tend to Nash equilibrium.(2)Under the two expected strategies,the power producer learns the output strategy,and its output strategy converges and is stable to Nash equilibrium.Under the adaptive expectation strategy,the faster the output adjustment speed of the power producer is,the faster the convergence speed of the output strategy will be.(3)Under the adaptive expectation strategy,the on-grid price and the green certificate price in the power market fluctuate less,and the acceleration of the output adjustment of power producers can make the on-grid price and the green certificate price more stable.(4)When the output adjustment speed of the two types of power generators is the same,with the acceleration of the output adjustment speed,the total profit and social welfare of the power generators will increase first and then decrease.Therefore,when the output adjustment speed is 0.81-1,the economic performance is the best when the power producer chooses the adaptive expectation strategy for learning.When the output adjustment speed is between 0.19 and 0.81,the adaptive expected strategy is the best economic benefit,but its corresponding social welfare level is not high.If the output adjustment speed is less than 0.19,the economic performance is the best when the power producer chooses the static expectation strategy for learning.When the output adjustment speed of the two types of generators is not consistent,the generators can obtain better economic benefits by continuing to choose the adaptive anticipatory strategy.(5)In the process of output learning by power generation companies,on the one hand,the lower limit of the quota ratio fluctuates around its equilibrium value;on the other hand,the price of green certificates may be higher than its equilibrium value.Therefore,in order to ensure the economic efficiency of the operation of the green certificate market during the dynamic game of the power generation companies,the quota ratio and fines need to be adjusted according to the learning behavior of the power generation companies. |
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