| With the increase in the market share of electric vehicles and the development of power battery technology,more and more power batteries will be decommissioned.If these retired power batteries cannot be properly handled,the ecological environment will be seriously polluted.From the practice of developed countries and China’s policy orientation,it can be found that the extended producer responsibility system(EPR)is becoming the guiding principle of power battery recycling,but the relationship between the stakeholders in the power battery recycling process is complicated.Under the "separation of vehicle and electricity" mode,battery producer and car manufacturer operate independently,and the unclear definition of recycling responsibilities makes it difficult to determine the responsible parties for recycling.Considering gradient utilization and corporate social responsibility(CSR)behavior,under the constraints of EPR,the identification of the main body of recycling responsibility and the selection and coordination of recycling modes have become issues of common concern for related enterprises,governments,and society.On the basis of sorting out the characteristics of retired power battery recycling and related theories,through the construction of the Stackelberg game model of power battery supply chain recycling under the constraints of EPR considering CSR behavior and gradient utilization,analyze the equilibrium solution under the four scenarios of CSR efforts of battery producer,gradient utilization company and battery producer,car manufacturer,gradient utilization company and car manufacturer,determine the responsible party for recycling and choose a recycling strategy.By introducing costsharing contracts and revenue-sharing contracts,a coordination mechanism is established to coordinate the "free rider" contradictions between battery producer and car manufacturer.Finally,use the relevant data of C company for application research.The results show that the profit of the supply chain system composed of battery producer and car manufacturer in the context of EPR is affected by consumer price sensitivity,R&D cost coefficient,and CSR cost coefficient.When consumers are highly price-sensitive and the R&D cost coefficient is higher than the CSR cost coefficient,the system profitability of the battery producer as the main body of recycling responsibility is the best;When the consumer’s price sensitivity is low and the R&D cost coefficient is lower than the CSR cost coefficient,the system profit of the car manufacturer as the main body of recovery responsibility is the best;When consumers are highly price-sensitive and the R&D cost coefficient is lower than the CSR cost coefficient,the system profit of the car manufacturer as the main body of recovery responsibility is the best.Secondly,the CSR costs of power battery supply chain members will shift to the downstream of the supply chain by increasing wholesale prices and retail prices,resulting in a reduction in consumer utility.Third,gradient utilization can improve the CSR level and profit of supply chain members and the overall.Finally,the coordination mechanism of the cost-sharing contract can encourage enterprises to fulfill their corporate social responsibilities and promote enterprise cooperation,while the coordination effect of the revenue-sharing contract is not good.Recycling decisions and coordination between members of the power battery supply chain are made under the constraints of EPR,by observing the CSR behaviors of battery producer,car manufacturer,and gradient utilization company,on the one hand,it determines the main body of recycling responsibility,explains the coupling relationship between battery producer and car manufacturer in recycling power batteries,and makes recycling decisions in different situations.On the other hand,in this process,both parties create value by introducing a contract to build a coordination mechanism,providing theoretical and practical references for government policy formulation and corporate recycling decisions. |