Study On Incentive And Restraint Mechanism Of Transportation Infrastructure PPP Project With Construction Enterprises Participating

At present,the mode of "two bids merged into one bid"("PPP + EPC")is generally used in the China’s transportation infrastructure PPP projects,where construction companies participate in the project as social capital.As an incentive measure by using a combination of project construction and operation for construction enterprises,this can meet the demand of the current transportation infrastructure construction market and it has good development prospects.However,at this stage,most of the PPP projects of China’s transport infrastructure are still in the construction period or the early stage of operation,the overall operation experience of the project is insufficient,and the incentive and restraint clauses of the contract are difficult to adapt to the changing market situation.In addition,in the operation process of the project,because the construction enterprise has many kinds of information advantages,such as construction cost and operation effort level,the existence of information asymmetry will generate principal-agent risk,which will affect the operation efficiency of the project.Therefore,how to design a scientific incentive and restraint mechanism to solve the above problems,to achieve double promotion of social and economic benefits for the project is the main foothold of this paper.First of all,this paper takes PPP project of transportation infrastructure as the research object,based on the existing research results of domestic and foreign scholars,the connotation of incentive and restraint mechanism and the characteristics of "two standards and one standard" in PPP project of transportation infrastructure are analyzed.This paper discusses in detail the problems existing in the current mechanism from the aspects of project investment and financing scheme,construction right,return mechanism and performance appraisal system.Secondly,this paper expounds the "two bids merged into one bid" mode of traffic infrastructure PPP projects of the principal-agent relationship under the asymmetric information.construction enterprise master as agent construction cost,operation effort level information superiority in many aspects,operating income,the government as a client is difficult to judge the authenticity of the information,make the project produces the transportation infrastructure PPP project the adverse selection and moral hazard problems.With the tools of game theory this paper analyses the game relationship between both sides and argumentation,established the theory of incentive compatibility information asymmetry more principal-agent model,through the measures of reasonable allocation of construction right,adjustment of capital structure,optimization of performance appraisal system and guarantee mechanism,the incentive and restraint mechanism of construction enterprises participating in PPP project of transportation infrastructure is designed.Finally,combined with the example of Hebei Qiancao highway PPP project,this paper analyzes the incentive and constraint problem of construction enterprises under asymmetric information and linear payment contract,and using genetic algorithm to get the best effort level and construction cost input of construction enterprises,so as to design the incentive and constraint mechanism of project contract.The change of traffic volume in operation period is simulated by binary tree method and Monte Carlo method,and the influence of inaccurate traffic volume prediction and the risk of construction cost overrun on the final mechanism and benefits of all parties is analyzed,which provided theoretical support for the design of incentive and constraint mechanism of transportation infrastructure PPP projects.