| The transformation of villages in cities is a game process involving multi-subjects,so there are some difficulties in its promotion,and the key is that its interests are difficult to achieve balance.In this paper,by using the theory of backward deduction,the interests of all subjects in the transformation of urban villages are reversed through the equilibrium state of the game,and a game model is established to determine the game strategies and game benefits of all stakeholders.Under four conditions,namely,the government provides policies,the village Committee cooperates,the villagers support,and the developers participate in the transformation of urban villages,the game equilibrium results are obtained.That is,the government provides policies,village Committee cooperation,villagers support,and developers participate in the transformation of villages in cities;The government provides policies,the village Committee cooperates,the villagers support,and the developers do not participate in the transformation of villages in cities;The government provides policies,village Committee cooperation,villagers’support,and social groups cooperate with the transformation;Government-led implementation,village cooperation,villagers’support,and social groups’cooperation and transformation.And summed up three transformation modes,namely,the government-led transformation mode of villages in cities,the collective independent transformation mode of village committees under preferential policies provided by the government,and the mode of developers participating in transformation under preferential policies provided by the government.It is found that XC project is located in the core area of the CBD of Zhujiang New Town,Guangzhou,with superior location conditions.The reason why the transformation of the village in the city is difficult to advance is that the village Committee did not fully fulfill its obligation to represent the interests of the villagers in the early demolition process,and the expression of villagers’demands was not taken seriously,which led to long-term conflicts,that is,it was always in an unbalanced state of game.Applying the previous theory,the XC project is more suitable for the model of developers participating in the transformation under the preferential policies provided by the government.The result of game equilibrium is that the government provides preferential policies,the village Committee cooperates,the villagers support and the developers participate in the transformation.It is found that the equilibrium conditions of economic benefits are:only when the floor area ratio is greater than or equal to 4.5 and the government auction land price is lower than30,567 yuan/m~2,developers are willing to participate in the reconstruction of villages in cities;Only when the price of commercial housing is higher than 31,015 yuan/m~2,can developers obtain development income higher than the average social value;Only when the compensation standard is equivalent to the local house price level,the villagers agree to carry out the reconstruction.The key factors affecting the balance of interests among the four parties are the volume ratio,land price,selling price,rent,compensation standard,etc.The benefits of game equilibrium are as follows:it can bring considerable tax revenue to the government and enhance its city image;it can bring about 22.2 billion revenue to developers;it can bring about200 million dividend income every year to the appreciation of village collective property;it can increase the rent of villagers by about 90,000 yuan every year;and it can improve their living environment for social groups.Therefore,factors such as floor area ratio,selling price,rent,land price,compensation standard and transformation mode should be considered in the future urban village reconstruction and urban renewal in Guangzhou.Through the research of the project,we try to provide objective and scientific basis for future project decision-making and operation,and enhance the success of the project. |
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