Research On The Influence Mechanism Of Government Incentives On Credit Loans Of Small And Micro Enterprises Under The "Government-Bank-Insurance" Mode

Affected by COVID-19 in 2020,the small and micro businesses’ financing problems are more severe.The credit loan of small and micro enterprises under the "Government-Bank-Insurance" mode is led by the government,and jointly with insurance companies and commercial banks to share the credit risk of small and micro enterprises through credit enhancement or financing guarantee,so as to increase the availability of small and micro enterprise loans.As the initiator of the "Government-Bank-Insurance" mode,the influence of government’s different incentive means and incentive degree on enterprise credit business is different.Therefore,on the basis of previous studies,combined with the development of "Government-Bank-Insurance" mode in the field of small and micro enterprise credit,this paper discusses the influence of government incentive policy on the operation of credit business from the perspective of government incentive under the two situations of fully rational and limited rational participants;Finally,an example is given to illustrate the influence of the model parameters on the equilibrium strategy,and some suggestions are put forward for the orderly operation of the "Government-Bank-Insurance" mode.The main contents of this study include:First,taking the insurance ratio as the signal,a fully rational signaling game model of small and micro enterprises’ credit business based on financial subsidy incentive is established from the perspective of micro individuals.The existence conditions and optimal insurance ratio of the model under the separation equilibrium and mixed equilibrium are solved,and the influence of government financial subsidy policy is discussed.Secondly,from the perspective of macro group,the paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model of small and micro enterprises’ credit business based on financial subsidy incentive under bounded rationality.The evolution strategy of participants is analyzed by copying dynamic equation and copying dynamic phase diagram;The evolution stability of potential equilibrium point is discussed by Jacobian matrix.At the same time,on the basis of sorting out policy implementation cases and subsidy schemes,this paper uses MATLAB simulation to analyze the impact of changes in government and market participants variables on the evolution trend of the system.Thirdly,a tripartite evolutionary game model of small and micro enterprises credit business based on government risk compensation under bounded rationality is established.On the basis of equilibrium solution,stability explanation and MATLAB simulation analysis,this paper analyzes the relationship between different policy incentives and the existence conditions of system equilibrium and the upper and lower limits of credit risk ratio.The research shows that the construction of credit system is the key to credit risk management of small and micro enterprises;Loan discount,premium subsidy and loan principal risk compensation policies can promote the evolution of the system to the equilibrium point and reduce the insurance proportion.The sensitivity of loan discount is the highest,the sensitivity of premium subsidy is marginal decreasing,and the sensitivity of loan principal compensation is the lowest.The risk compensation of excess compensation has no obvious effect on the system equilibrium;In addition,the higher the excess borrowing cost of small and micro enterprises,the lower the bank borrowing rate,the lower the operating cost,the higher the interest rate preference,and the higher the insurance ratio,the more the system tends to evolve into equilibrium.Finally,according to the research results,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for the government and other participants.