Enterprise Scale、Political Background And Selective Enforcement Of Securities Regulatory Authority

At present,China’s economy is in a transitional period,the securities market is not mature enough,and the regulatory legal system has yet to be improved.The effective enforcement of the securities regulatory agencies with "one council and two institutions" has become an important line of defense for maintaining the stable operation of the securities market.In reality,the lack of enforcement resources,the intervention of external administrative forces,and the political responsibilities of stabilizing the economic environment make it difficult for for regulators to "treat the same",so differentiated enforcement behaviors appear.Existing scholars have pointed out that such differentiated law enforcement reduces the efficiency of enforcement and makes listed companies "actively transform" to avoid regulation.However,enforcement by regulatory agencies is a complex activity that includes multiple processes.Therefore,in order to find out the root cause of differentiated law enforcement,it is necessary to start with the analysis of specific enforcement links(including filing and punishment)to "apply the right remedy to the case".Among the external characteristics of a company,scale can be said to be a comprehensive manifestation of the company’s strength.It not only affects the company’s ability to finance and resist risks,but also has an important impact on the regional economy and social employment.The scale of the regulatory object is naturally also a concern during the law enforcement process of the regulatory agency.the key of.Therefore,exploring the impact of enterprise scale on the differentiated enforcement of regulatory agencies has important practical significance.Based on the above analysis,this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as samples to explore the impact of listed companies’ enterprise scale on the enforcement of regulatory agencies,and makes an in-depth analysis of the fairness of regulatory agencies’ enforcement from the two aspects of case-filing investigation and punishment.On this basis,we also consider the influence of corporate political background factors on the relationship between corporate scale and regulatory authorities’ investigation and punishment intensity.The results show that regulators tend to deal with smaller listed companies in the process of filing investigation,while in the process of punishment,there is no significant difference in the severity of punishment,and the treatment is more fair;After considering the political background of the enterprises,it is found that the regulatory authorities are more inclined to deal with the listed companies without political background in the process of case-filing and investigation for the offending enterprises of similar scale,while in the process of punishment,the results show that the political background of the listed companies does not play an obvious role.Further research found that under the influence of the policy signal of "fair law enforcement" of the 18 th CPC National Congress,the fairness of the law enforcement in the regulatory investigation and punishment process was significantly improved compared with that before the implementation of the policy.In addition,after being punished,the irregularities of listed companies are not inhibited,instead,they adopt a more covert way.However,compared with small enterprises,the irregularities of large listed companies are inhibited and their irregularities are also relatively reduced after being punished.This paper deeply analyzes the generation of selective enforcement by securities regulatory agencies from the two stages of filing and punishment,and finds that selective enforcement mainly occurs in the filing stage,which enriches the research perspective of this field and makes the research conclusion more comprehensive.On this basis,the influence of political background and policy signals is further considered,which provides a new way of thinking for the subsequent strengthening of market regulation and improving the efficiency of regulation,and also provides a new perspective for the future research on related types.In view of the current differentiated enforcement phenomenon,this paper believes that we can improve the efficiency of enforcement and promote fair enforcement by optimizing the allocation of enforcement resources of regulatory departments,improving laws and regulations,and innovating supervision methods.