Cooperation Mechanism And Incentive Analysis Of Online Game Supply Chain With Product Competition

The thesis examines the coopetition decision-making issues of an online game supply chain composed of two online game development enterprises（developers）and an online game sales platform（platform provider）.In supply chain cooperation,competing developers can either separately or collectively cooperate with the platform provider.Based on the forms of coopetition of participating enterprises,the thesis first constructs decision-making models that reflect the three different situations of coopetition of participating enterprises in the online game supply chain: competition model,separate bargaining model,collective bargaining model.Subsequently,the thesis obtains the optimal coopetition strategies of participating enterprises in the online game supply chain through the equilibrium analysis of the decision-making models,and reveals the dependence of these optimal decisions and strategies on the product competition intensity and bargaining power.Finally,the thesis also puts forward the optimal coopetition strategy of the online game supply chain through a comparative analysis of the coopetition models,revealing the dependence of the optimal coopetition strategy on product competition intensity,bargaining power,and internal management capabilities,and on this basis,describing the market conditions corresponding to the optimal decision-making of the participating enterprises in the online game supply chain.These findings provide potentially strategic guidance for the online game supply chain to pursue coopetition in various business environments.The thesis shows that:（1）in the online game supply chain without considering the bargaining power,product competition intensity does not always have a negative impact on the decision-making strategies of developers and platform provider,and the decision-making strategies of developers and platform provider have a symmetrical dependence on product competition intensity.（2）in the online game supply chain considering the bargaining power,if two developers compete with the platform provider separately,the decision-making strategies of developers don’t depend on the product competition intensity,while the decision-making strategies of the platform provider not only depend on the developer bargaining power,and are inversely proportional to the product competition intensity.（3）in the online game supply chain considering the bargaining power,if two developers collectively compete with the platform provider,the product competition intensity will always have a negative impact on the developers’ decision-making strategies.The dependence of platform provider decision-making strategy on product competition intensity not only depends on the bargaining power among developers and the difference in production efficiency between developers,but also can have a positive or negative response to product competition intensity.（4）the optimal coopetition strategy is dynamic,caused by important internal and external factors,including product competition intensity,bargaining power of enterprises and difference in production efficiency.When both the intensity of market competition and the gap of the production efficiency between enterprises are high,developers can collectively play a coopetition game with the platform provider,which can achieve Pareto optimality in the cooperation of the online game supply chain.