Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain Based On Stochastic Perspective

This paper mainly focuses on the input degree of logistics resources in the upstream link of fresh agricultural products supply chain,and constructs the evolutionary game model between suppliers and processors,the three-party evolutionary game model under government supervision and the stochastic evolutionary game model under the uncertain environment.The main research contents of this paper are summarized as follows:The first chapter briefly describes the background and significance of the research on the supply chain of fresh agricultural products,as well as the domestic and foreign research status of the supply chain of agricultural products.The second chapter introduces the relevant definitions,lemmas and theorems used in this paper,mainly the knowledge of replication dynamic equation,evolutionary stability strategy,stochastic differential equation,stability criterion and so on.In Chapter 3,an evolutionary game model between suppliers and processors is constructed,and knowledge of replicated dynamic equation and evolutionary game theory is used to obtain the equilibrium point in the system and analyze the influence of parameter changes on the evolutionary stability strategy of the system.The research shows that the logistics resource investment strategy of merchants is closely related to the rate of return increase of both sides’ logistics resource investment.When the rate of return increase of both sides’ logistics resource investment keeps changing,a variety of stable strategies of system evolution can be obtained.If the ”free rider” behavior gains a large amount of income,the enthusiasm of merchants to choose logistics resources investment will be reduced.The fourth chapter introduces the government supervision mechanism,establishes the tripartite evolutionary game model under the government supervision,analyzes the trend of the behavior subject’s strategy choice in the model and obtains the system’s evolutionary stability strategy,and carries on the simulation analysis.The research shows that government regulators are more willing to choose the ”supervision” strategy when the image effectiveness is improved,the supervision cost is reduced and the penalty amount is increased.When merchants actively invest logistics resources,the higher the rate of income increase,the lower the cost of input,the less income obtained by ”free rider” behavior,and the greater the penalty for negative input,merchants are more inclined to ”active input” strategy.In Chapter 5,the white Gaussian noise is introduced into the evolutionary game as a random disturbance item on the supply chain,and the stochastic evolutionary game model under the uncertain environment is constructed.The condition of exponential stability of zero solution moment in the model is obtained,and the stochastic differential equation of It (?) type is expanded by Taylor for simulation.The research shows that when the actors on the supply chain adopt the strategy of positive attitude,the game side will tend to the stable state faster with the increase of interference intensity.When the passive strategy is adopted,the game side will gradually become unstable with the increase of interference intensity.