Evolutionary Game Study On Illegal Dumping Supervision Of Construction And Demolition Waste Under Multi-governance

With the continuous improvement of China’s urbanization,the implementation of largescale urban construction and reconstruction projects has generated a large amount of construction and demolition waste(C&D waste).Illegal C&D waste not only occupies land,damages the appearance of the city and even endangers the safety of urban residents,but also brings great pressure to urban management.In 2005,Urban C&D Waste Management Regulations formulated by The State Council made an overall plan for C&D waste supervision for the first time.Subsequently,governments at all levels issued a large number of relevant regulatory policies and implemented certain regulatory measures.Up to now,C&D waste supervision in China has been carried out for more than 10 years,but it has not achieved satisfactory results,and illegal dumping of C&D waste frequently occurs.The frequent occurrence of illegal dumping of C&D waste shows that there are some problems and deficiencies in the current supervision system.Therefore,it is urgent to make further research on the improvement of C&D waste supervision system.First of all,this paper deeply analyzes the current situation and problems of domestic C&D waste supervision.It is found that there are two main problems in the current supervision process: the single supervision subject of illegal C&D waste dumping,and the responsibilities of local governments are unclear in the process of cross-regional supervision.Thus,based on the single subject of supervision of illegal C&D waste dumping,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model of tripartite governance by waste emitting units,the public and the government.Considering the profit situation of the emission unit,the illegal dumping behavior is discussed from the perspective of game equilibrium,and verified and analyzed by Matlab.The results show that it should be a long-term policy for the government to reduce the illegal income of emission units,so as to promote their spontaneous and legal disposal.When the illegal income is small,the public can replace the government to play the role of illegal dumping supervision,while when the illegal income is large,it is necessary to establish a government-led supervision system with active participation of the public.Next,aiming at the prevalent problem of the responsibilities of local governments are unclear in the process of cross-regional supervision,an evolutionary game model between local governments is constructed under two conditions: no upper-level government constraints and those with upper-level government constraints,and the strategic choices and influencing factors of local governments are discussed.The research shows that without the constraints of the superior government,the local governments will stabilize their own interests in the non-regulatory strategy,which will lead to the occurrence of "public tragedy";There are differences and targeted formulations;under the constraint mechanism of the central government,increasing the supervision of local governments,increasing penalties for non-supervision,and reducing supervision costs can actively promote the formation of joint supervision,thereby effectively solving illegal dumping in different places.Finally,the two classic cases are deeply analyzed to demonstrate the scientific nature and feasibility of the evolutionary game model,and effective policy suggestions are put forward for the regulatory problems exposed in the cases,providing practical reference experience for the improvement of C&D waste supervision efficiency in China.