Research On The Optimal Pricing Model Of New Energy Vehicle And New Technology Service

With the rapid development of the new energy vehicle sales market scale,the pricing of new technology services for new energy vehicles has become a focus of attention for new energy vehicle enterprises.According to the sales practice of new energy vehicles,the current pricing model for new technology services is mainly divided into the buy-out model with a one-time fee and the subscription model with a continuous fee in stages.The buy-out model can meet consumers’ needs for permanent use,but the one-time payment price is relatively high;the subscription model can support consumers’ on-demand use and diversified needs,and alleviate the financial pressure of one-time payment.Therefore,for new energy vehicle manufacturers,the pricing model adopted is key to the sale of new energy vehicle services for new technologies.Based on a summary of relevant research results at home and abroad,this thesis draws on the pricing results and supply chain model choices regarding new energy vehicle products and services,uses theories and methods such as game theory,supply chain management and revenue management to analyse the market equilibrium of new energy vehicle new technology services under different supply chain models,and further analyses the market equilibrium of new energy vehicle new technology services under differentiated service levels to explore the optimal pricing model for new technology service manufacturers and retailers.Firstly,for the pricing problem of new energy vehicle new technology services under different supply chain models,the Stacklberg game model under secondary and tertiary supply chains is constructed,the equilibrium decisions of each node enterprise under the buyout model and subscription model are discussed,the effects of price sensitivity coefficient,new technology spillover effect coefficient and pooling effect coefficient under the subscription model on the pricing model of new technology services and enterprise profits are analysed The optimal pricing model of the new technology service sales supply chain of new energy vehicles under different supply chains is compared.The study shows that under the buyout and subscription models,the pricing and profits of the supply chain firms decrease as the price sensitivity coefficient increases,while the pricing and profits of the supply chain firms increase as the spillover effect of new technologies increases.The profit of each firm in the secondary supply chain is greater than that of the tertiary supply chain under different pricing models,and the optimal choice for manufacturers and retailers is the subscription model when the pooling efficiency factor is small.Secondly,based on the previous study,the pricing equilibrium of new technology services in different pricing models is further studied based on the optimal secondary supply chain model and considering the strategy of differentiated services provided by retailers.The impact of the new technology spillover coefficient,service level preference coefficient and pooling effect coefficient on the pricing and profit of the new technology service supply chain under the subscription model is analysed,and the optimal pricing strategies of the new technology service supply chain for new energy vehicles under the differentiated services in the buyout and subscription models are compared and analysed.The study shows that the profits of retailers and manufacturers in the buyout and subscription models in different service levels decrease with the increase of price sensitivity coefficient and increase with the increase of new technology spillover effect coefficient;when the pooling effect coefficient is small,the subscription model should be used,in which retailers can make the most profit by providing high service levels when the consumer service level preference coefficient is large,and conversely retailers should provide low service levels;when the pooling When the pooling effect coefficient is large,a buy-out model should be used,in which the retailer can profit most from providing high service levels when the consumer service level preference coefficient is small,and conversely the retailer should provide low service levels.