Stakeholder Research Under The Development Strategy Of New Energy Automobile Industry

The development of new energy automobile industry plays an important role in coping with global warming and energy crisis,promoting the transformation and development of the automobile industry,and forming a green and low-carbon lifestyle for people.The development strategy of China’s new energy automobile industry starts from the "863 Plan" put forward by the state in 2001.After that,the state continues to introduce relevant policies to develop the new energy automobile industry.After more than 20 years of development,the new energy automobile industry has begun to take shape and made certain achievements,but there is still a long way to go from the mature market.This paper uses evolutionary game theory and industry life cycle theory to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model of government,automobile enterprises and consumers.Firstly,the replicative dynamic equation was constructed to solve the equilibrium point,and the stability of the equilibrium point was analyzed to establish the evolutionary equilibrium solution of the model.Then,the stability of the equilibrium point was verified by simulation.Finally,the influence of three parameters,namely the government’s R&D and production subsidies,the R&D and production input of the automobile enterprises,and the consumer’s utility,on the strategy selection and path evolution of each main body was simulated.The results show that the government’s withdrawal from the subsidy support for new energy vehicles,the continuous development of high-quality new energy vehicles by automobile enterprises,and the purchase of new energy vehicles by consumers are the final stable results after the longterm game of the three parties.Government subsidies play a certain role in promoting the development and production of new energy vehicles by automobile enterprises and the purchase of new energy vehicles by consumers in the short term.Automobile enterprises increase the investment in research and development and production of high-quality new energy vehicles,will extend the time of the government’s subsidy support for new energy vehicles.The increase of investment in R&D and production of high-quality new energy vehicles by automobile enterprises will delay the time for consumers to buy new energy vehicles;The greater the difference between the utility of consumers to buy high-quality new energy vehicles and ordinary technology new energy vehicles,the faster the government tends not to subsidize the new energy vehicle market.When the utility difference between consumers’ purchase of highquality new energy vehicles and ordinary technology new energy vehicles is higher,the power of automobile enterprises’ research and development and production of high-quality new energy vehicles will increase.Based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward the following three suggestions: First,the government should adopt flexible incentive policies.Second,automobile enterprises should actively develop and produce high-quality new energy vehicles.Third,improve the utility of consumers by improving after-sales service.