Dynamic Analysis And Control Strategy Of The Supervision Game Of "Cheats" In New Energy Automobile Enterprises

The government's fraudulent supervision of new energy auto companies is the key to reducing financial funds caused by fraudulent subsidies and implementing the subsidies policies for various new energy auto industries.The dynamics and complexity of the new energy auto industry's fraudulent supervision make forecasting and controlling often fail,so study on subsidy regulation strategies for new energy auto industry is an urgent task.At present,the traditional game theory analysis of subsidies and frauds mainly focuses on the solution of game equilibrium,ignoring the uncertainty of dynamic game process under bounded rational conditions.In recent years,evolutionary game research based on bounded rationality mainly discusses the existence of evolutionary stability strategy,and lacks the analysis of related control strategies.So that,this paper analyze the dynamic evolution process of the supervision game between the government and the new energy automobile enterprises,and use the dynamic punishment strategy to optimize the control of the volatility of the game process,and other measures to curb corporate fraud.This paper takes the evolution process of fraudulent supervision game between government and enterprises as the research object,and takes the dynamic punishment strategy as the main control means,and studies the dynamic analysis and stability control of the game.By using game theory to model the long-term dynamic game relationship between the government and companies,combines evolution game with system dynamics,and analyzes the impact of dynamic penalties and other policies on the game process and equilibrium.To reveal the dynamics of the game process and propose a dynamic punishment strategy.This paper first analyzes the government's support policies and related regulatory policies for the new energy automobile industry,and finds out the problems in China's new energy automobile industry supervision policy.According to the typical fraud case,the different types of corporate fraud are summarized;on the basis of different types of fraudulent compensation,an evolutionary game model of fraudulent supervision under bounded rational conditions is established,and the evolutionary stability strategy is determined by Jacobian matrix.The stability strategy is verified by evolutionary game system dynamics model and simulation.In the absence of ESS,a dynamic penalty strategy is proposed to suppress the fluctuation of the fraudulent decision.This paper combines the evolutionary game dynamics research and system dynamics simulation to analyze the problem of fraudulent supervision of companies,which provides a good reference for future research on theoretical and technical tools.