China has entered an aging society.In the face of China’s rapidly growing population aging and the demand for elderly services,local governments and entrepreneurs have set foot in the elderly service industry.Combined with the local actual situation,they have further formulated specific policies and plans to support the development of the elderly care industry.In order to fully liberalize the elderly service market,greatly improve the effective supply capacity of elderly services and products,and make the supply structure more reasonable,China’s "several opinions on comprehensively liberalizing the elderly service market and improving the quality of elderly service" points out that the development of the elderly service industry is guided by the supply chain model,so as to effectively improve the service quality.The development of elderly service industry not only conforms to the trend of aging and diversified pension subjects in China,but also reflects the practice of the principle of shared social responsibility.At present,the elderly service industry has improved in terms of market supply,price and efficiency,but the overall situation is not optimistic,and there are still some problems to be solved.The service quality and service level of elderly service providers are one of the important factors determining the survival and development of elderly care institutions.Based on this,from the perspective of elderly service supply chain,this paper constructs an elderly service supply chain model composed of elderly service integrators,elderly service providers and elderly customers by using Stackelberg game,puts the integrators’ corporate social responsibility into the decision-making of elderly service supply chain,and studies the situation of different subjects without government subsidies and government subsidies,The optimal service quality level of the elderly service supply chain and the collaborative decision-making of pricing,this paper analyzes the impact of corporate social responsibility,price sensitivity coefficient,service sensitivity coefficient and government subsidies on the optimal decision-making and related profits of relevant node enterprises in the elderly service supply chain,studies the coordination of the supply chain by using two-part pricing contract,and redistributes the fixed subsidy cost by using Nash bargaining model.Finally,the effectiveness of the model and contract is verified by numerical simulation and actual case analysis.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)Under the different subject situations of no government subsidy and government subsidy,compared with the centralized decision-making mode,the service quality level of the optimal provider,the service quality level of the optimal integrator,the market service demand of the elderly service supply chain and the total profit of elderly service supply chain are reduced,and the correlation between the relevant sensitivity coefficient and the cost coefficient determines the size of the service price of decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making.(2)Price sensitivity coefficient has a negative effect on service price,service quality level,market service demand,service integrator profit,service provider profit and total supply chain profit.Both integrator service sensitivity coefficient and provider service sensitivity coefficient have a positive effect on each optimal decision.(3)The level of social responsibility of integrators has a positive effect on service price,service quality,market service demand and service provider profit.With the increase of the level of social responsibility undertaken by the integrator,the integrator’s profit and the total profit of the supply chain increase first and then decrease,and the integrator’s profit decreases first.(4)Under the government subsidizing the service costs of service providers and service integrators respectively,integrator service quality level,provider service quality level,integrator profit,provider profit and total supply chain profit increase.The government subsidized service cost has little impact on the service price and greatly improves the service quality level,which can greatly improve the service quality level of relevant node enterprises.In terms of the improvement effect of service quality of providers,the government subsidy to providers is better than that to subsidy integrators.On the contrary,in terms of the effect of improving the service quality of integrators,the government subsidy to integrators is better than that to subsidy providers.(5)Through the two-part pricing contract,the coordination and optimization of the elderly service supply chain can be realized.Among them,the fixed subsidy fee should be set to meet the requirements that the profits of service providers and service integrators are greater than those in the non contractual coordination situation,and the fixed subsidy fee is related to the bargaining power of each node enterprise in the supply chain.When the bargaining power of the service provider is large,the provider can obtain channel profits to a large extent.On the contrary,when the bargaining power of the service integrator is large,the integrator can obtain channel profits to a large extent. |