On Alliance Management System Of Balance Of Power

This thesis provides a balancing model of alliance management,called the theory of Alliance Management System of Balance of Power(AMSBP).The theory starts with providing a new concept of AMSBP,and tries to explain how alliance power distribution,a structural factor,affects the ways of alliance management.Then,we adopt process tracing,through Bismarck’s alliance system,to test the core assumptions and finally confirm them.AMSBP refers to a model of alliance management in which some alliances are formed to contain rivals,others to their allies so that their allies are constrained to have to fulfil their obligations and not pursue their own greedy national interests.Besides,we seek to further investigate the independent variables and their causal mechanisms of AMSBP.And,alliance power distribution is regarded as the main factor,which refers to the power distribution of member states in an alliance and usually exists as three main strands of polarity: unipolarity,bipolarity,and multipolarity.Here,polarity is related to the systemic architecture in an alliance,but not that in the international system.Based on it,the research presents two core assumptions.Assumption I: In an unipolar alliance,the strongest state has no need to adopt AMSBP.Assumption II: In a bipolar or multipolar alliance,states tend to adopt AMSBP.Meanwhile,the research takes alliance competitive interests as the alternative variable and presents the competitive assumptions.That is,when alliance member state are competitive,they tend to turn to AMSBP.Next,We seek to test the core assumptions through smoking-gun test of the process tracing method,while competitive assumption through hoop test of the process tracing method.As to case selection,we mainly consider those which contain the experience data of the casual mechanism and its certainty,and choose the Bismarck’s alliance system as the case to test the core assumptions.As to exclude the competitive assumption,we select the U.S.-Japan Alliance,characterized by bilateral trade friction,as the case for process tracing.They have fiercely competitive interests in economic field,but they have been expanding and deepening bilateral cooperation in many fields,not mention the bilateral alliance breaks up.It is helpful to disprove the competitive hypothesis.Finally,the research found that it is the alliance power distribution,not alliance competitive interests,that determines the adoption of AMSBP.In a unipolar alliance,the strongest state is so powerful to control its weak allies and force them to serve its own strategic objectives,so it has no need to ask AMSBP for external power to control its weak allies.By contrast,in a bipolar or multipolar alliance,each state has the ability to break the alliance without punishment,so states tend to turn to other allies to contain the allies in another alliance,which contributes to the formation of AMSBP.Besides,the research also found that AMSBP provides a structural perspective to discuss the timing of wedge strategy.The results not only further enrich the theories of alliance management,but also provides theoretical reference for the diplomatic practice of China’s strategic opportunity to divide its rivals alliances.