| At present,the development of modern company system has been increasingly mature,the separation of enterprise ownership and management is the general trend.Due to limited time and energy,shareholders usually sign contracts with professional managers and entrust them with enterprise management.However,as agents,managers are inevitably prone to conflict with shareholders in terms of interests.Shareholders are the owners of enterprises and pay more attention to the development and performance of enterprises.Managers are agents who want to maximize their own interests during their tenure.The mutual deviation between the two is likely to lead to managers to maximize their own interests and do some contrary to the interests of shareholders,that is,management defense behavior.Now about a manager management of the defensive behavior impact on corporate performance does not see more,so this article from the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is a perspective,explore the manager defensive impact on enterprise performance management,and on the basis of introducing the regulating variable,corporate governance of rich managers manage the economic consequences of a defensive behavior research,realize the enterprise performance has been a steady and orderly development is of great significance.This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from 2013 to 2017 as the research object for five consecutive years.Based on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,stakeholder theory and high echelon theory,this paper explores the relationship between manager management defense,corporate governance and corporate performance by using multiple linear regression analysis.Then,these enterprises are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises according to the property right nature,and the relationship between these two types of enterprises will change.After empirical research,the following conclusions are drawn:first,the higher the manager’s management defense level,the lower the enterprise performance;Second,the degree of equity balance can effectively restrain the damage of managers’ management defense to enterprise performance;Thirdly,the independent director can not play a good role in regulating the damage of enterprise performance by inhibiting the management defense of managers.Fourth,in the further research,it is found that the independent directors in state-owned enterprises have no significant regulating effect on the management defense and corporate performance of managers,but the independent directors in non-state-owned enterprises can play a good regulating effect.Based on the above empirical research results,this paper gives the following Suggestions:first,improve the enterprise manager selection system,reduce the government’s administrative intervention in the appointment of managers,and establish an appropriate term limit;Second,strengthen the professional ethics of managers,avoid mercenary,make managers strive for the goal of maximizing the interests of the enterprise;Third,appropriately improve the degree of equity balance,avoid managers’ opportunistic behavior;Fourth,encourage independent directors to better play their supervision functions and make them participate in corporate governance with a more active attitude. |
