Research On Governance Of Non-state Shareholders And Accounting Conservatism

High-quality financial report information is the premise of the wholesome and stationary movement of capital market and effective company governance.How to better enhance the quality of company financial report information and promote the formation of effective governance structure of corporate has attached great importance in the fields of law and policy systems,theoretical research and social practice.High quality financial report information requires companies to strictly follow the principle of prudence in the procedure of accounting practice and information disclosure.Accounting onservatism is momentous for companies to optimize their internal governance mechanism and prevent and resolve operational risks.However,state-owned enterprises(SOE)in soft budget constraints,insider control,owner absence and weak regulatory mechanism will reduce the level of information transparency and asymmetric information disclosure of enterprises,leading to state-owned enterprises accounting robustness concerns.In the course of the new stage of SOE reform,how to improve the accounting conservatism level of SOE has the research value and practical value of in-depth exploration.Since 2013,SOE reform has stepped into a new stage of the reform of introducing mixed ownership to SOEs(mixed reform).In June 2020,the Three-year Action Plan for SOE reform(2020-2022)put forward to "strengthen mixed ownership reform in different levelsand categories,and actively promote the active role of non-state shareholders".Mixed reform directly introduces non-state capital in form,but essentially emphasizes the importance of non-state shareholders taking part in company governance activities.The active introduce of non-state shareholders can not only balance state-owned shareholders and weaken the policy burden and administrative intervention of SOE by virtue of the ownership structure,but also supervise and restrain management behaviors by appointing personnel to participate in the governance of SOE,which makes the governance efficiency of non-state stockholders increasingly prominent.Then,what role does non-state stockholders governance play in SOE mixed reform? Can the governance effect be achieved by improving accounting conservatism?The research shows that accounting conservatism is not only a basic characteristic of accounting information quality,but also an efficient and key governance mechanism,which is of great significance for optimizing the governance level of SOE.Based on this,this thesis selects listed SOEs in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share from2008 to 2019 as the object,and takes the background of SOEs mixed reform,through theoretical demonstration and empirical test to explore whether non-state shareholder governance can improve the accounting conservatism of SOEs.Then the mechanism path of non-state stockholder governance affecting the choice of accounting policy is investigated.Then we explore whether the influence of non-state shareholder government on accounting conservatism is affected by the internal and external environmental heterogeneity of SOEs.Finally,explore the economic consequences.The consequences indicate that: Firstly,the non-state shareholders to produce hybrid equity ownership alone is not enough to have great influence in the SOEs governance structure and control,only to the appointed directors,supervisors and senior managers of SOEs to participate in high-level management SOEs,in order to take maximum advantage of its significance in the operating decision and the internal control construction,to effectively improve SOEs accounting conservatism,To achieve the goal of optimizing company governance level;Secondly,non-state stockholders’ designation of directors,supervisors and executives to participate in high-level governance can improve the accounting conservatism of SOEs by reducing agency costs and enhancing management incentives.Thirdly,the role of non-state shareholders to appoint directors,supervisors and supervisors to participate in high-level governance to improve accounting conservatism is more significant when SOEs face high degree of uncertainty in external economic policy and little pressure from external public opinion supervision.When SOEs belong to competitive industries and local SOEs,the significance of non-state stockholders to designate staff to take part in high-level governance is more obvious to improve their accounting conservatism.Fourthly,after introducing non-state stockholders to participate in high-level governance to enhance accounting conservatism,the company value of SOEs also increases significantly.The research values and innovations of the passage are precipitated as belows: Firstly,from the perspective of non-state stockholders,this paper analyzes that non-state stockholders,as a crucial contractual benefit demanders,have strong motivation to require SOEs to provide robust financial information,which expands the research on the supervision motivation of accounting conservatism,and reveals the significant value of accounting conservatism in the governance of SOEs.Secondly,it strengthens and highlights the governance efficiency of non-state stockholders,provides a new view for the research on the influence of non-state shareholders on the financial decisions of management,and expands the theoretical study on the economic effects of SOEs mixed reform.Thirdly,Based on the perspective of optimizing supervisory and reinforcing motivation system,from the paths of agency cost and management equity incentive,this thesis expounds the mechanism of non-state shareholders’ participation in high-level governance to improve accounting conservatism,and provides a new theory for the guiding ideology that SOEs need to further improve their internal governance and incentive mechanism for mixed reform.