Research On The Path Of Policy Financing Guarantee To Promote SMEs’ Green Technology Innovation

Small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)are an important part of the market economy.Under the “carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals,” green technology innovation of SMEs is an important way to coordinate economic development and environmental protection.However,SMEs have low credit ratings and insufficient financial support.The financing problem needs to be solved urgently.Policy financing guarantee is an effective way to increase SMEs’ credit.China has gradually established the policy financing guarantee system,which has achieved remarkable results in reducing the financing cost and threshold of SMEs.Based on the above analysis,this thesis explores the path for policy financing guarantees to achieve effective credit enhancement for SMEs’ green technology innovation,which is conducive to alleviating the financing difficulties faced by SMEs in the low-carbon transition and helping SMEs achieve sustainable development.This thesis firstly sorts out the theory and research status related to green technology innovation and policy financing guarantee,then measures the current efficiency of financial support for green technology innovation of SMEs,and points out the importance of financial support to green technology innovation of SMEs.Information asymmetry and bank risk aversion are two critical reasons for the financing difficulties of SMEs.For alleviating the above problems,this thesis puts forward the mechanism of credit enhancement and risk-sharing of policy financing guarantees and the basic logic of using policy financing guarantees to help SMEs achieve green technology innovation.In the process of policy financing guarantees assisting SMEs in innovating green technologies,multiple participants are involved,and they engage in continuous strategic games for their interests.Evolutionary game theory is a practical tool for analyzing multi-agent strategies.Therefore,based on evolutionary game theory,this thesis finally constructs a quadrilateral evolutionary game model composed of SMEs,banks,guarantee agencies,and the government and analyzes the key factors that affect the stability of the game system.The factors are simulated and verified by case studies.The research finds that:(1)In the early stage of financing of SMEs’ green technology innovation,keeping the fixed risk ratio between guarantee agencies and banks unchanged,reducing the government’s financial burden,and strengthening the construction of the reguarantee system can indirectly increase the enthusiasm for cooperation between banks and guarantee agencies;(2)In the long run,the policy effect of interest subsidy and guarantee fee subsidy is small,but in the short term,the interest subsidy policy has a better effect on promoting SMEs’ compliance and bank-guarantee cooperation;(3)It is necessary to provide high-quality SMEs with reasonable interest rate concessions and guarantee rate concessions,and reasonably increase the penalties for defaulting companies.According to the research results,this thesis puts forward corresponding suggestions to promote policy financing guarantees to facilitate SMEs’ green technology innovation from four aspects: establishing green technology innovation information disclosure mechanism,expanding green technology innovation financing channels for SMEs,and improving policy financing guarantee risk management system and policy financing guarantee support mechanism.