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Research On Subsidy Strategy Of Agricultural Land Transfer In Agricultural Industrial Park Of H District Of W City

Posted on:2023-04-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q Y RenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306902481244Subject:Public Administration
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,the scale of agricultural land transfer is rapidly expanding in China,and agricultural land transfer patterns are increasingly mature,but in the process of agricultural land transfer,how farmers,enterprises and the government make decisions to get maximum benefit(or social welfare),how the government promotes the large-scale transfer of agricultural land and the construction of agricultural industrial parks through subsidy policies,how the government avoids risks in the process of distributing subsidy,are also problems that need to be solved urgently.Therefore,this paper studies agricultural land transfer status of agricultural industrial park of H district of W city,establishes three kinds of government subsidy strategy models which are zero subsidy strategy,subsidy strategy for farmers and subsidy strategy for enterprises.By analyzing and comparing three models,the advantages and disadvantages of the three models are clarified,specific subsidy schemes are given,which provides inspiration and reference for the government of H district of W city to formulate subsidy policies and provides basis for farmers and enterprises to make decisions.Under zero subsidy strategy,the profits of farmers and enterprises are low,the scale of agricultural land transfer is small.Subsidy for farmers strategy can improve the profits of farmers and enterprises as well as the overall social welfare,increase the scale of agricultural land transfer.But if the subsidy for farmers is too high,farmers may pay enterprises to transfer their land so as to obtain the government subsidy,that is,there is a “subsidy fraud”equilibrium.Subsidy for enterprises can also improve the profits of farmers and enterprises as well as the overall social welfare,increase the scale of agricultural land transfer.Moreover,this paper unexpectedly found a “benefit equivalence theorem”: no matter for the profits of farmers and enterprises or the social welfare of H district of W city,subsidy strategy for farmers is equivalent to the subsidy strategy for enterprises.Even so,compared with the subsidy strategy for farmers,the subsidy strategy for enterprises still has some differences: it does not have a “subsidy fraud” equilibrium.On the basis of the above theoretical results,this paper substituted the actual data and obtained the solution of agricultural land transfer subsidy in H District of W City: At present,the government of H District of W City can choose the subsidy strategy for farmers or enterprises;when farmers are subsidized,the optimal subsidy amount of watermelon planting land in the industrial park should be 14.55 yuan per mu(Chinese unit of land measurement that is commonly 666.7 square meters)per year,and the optimal subsidy amount of radish planting land in the industrial park should be 17.04 yuan per mu per year;when enterprises are subsidized,the optimal subsidy amount of watermelon planting land in the industrial park should be 14.55 per mu per year,and the optimal subsidy amount of radish planting land in the industrial park should be 17.04 per mu per year.In addition,this paper also puts forward a series of countermeasures and suggestions for the practice of agricultural land transfer in H District of W City.
Keywords/Search Tags:Agricultural Land Transfer, Government Subsidy, Agricultural Industrial Park
PDF Full Text Request
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