Research On The Level Measurement And Evolution Game Of Logistics Infrastructure Interconnection In Urban Agglomerations

Under the background of globalization,the development level of urban agglomeration has become an important index to measure regional economic development.In China,the regional planning of urban agglomerations is regarded as an important development deployment,and several national agglomerations have been approved.The development of urban agglomerations depends on a sound infrastructure system.In order to promote the opening and cooperation among urban agglomerations under the new situation of"transportation power strategy",more attention should be paid to infrastructure connectivity.Therefore,how to quantify the development level of urban agglomeration connectivity and analyze the cooperation and competition between cities in the process of promoting urban agglomeration logistics infrastructure connectivity is of great significance for promoting the coordinated development of urban agglomeration and the orderly and coordinated development of urban agglomeration logistics industry.For this purpose,based on the analysis of the current situation of the development of urban agglomerations,this paper studies the measurement of the connectivity level of logistics infrastructure of urban agglomerations and the game phenomenon existing in the process of infrastructure construction.The main research contents include:（1）Based on the analysis of the development status of logistics infrastructure in urban agglomerations,the connectivity index system of logistics infrastructure in urban agglomerations is constructed from node dimension,channel dimension,transport capacity dimension,postal industry dimension and investment dimension.In addition,entropy weight method is introduced to calculate the index weights of 12 provinces and cities under the jurisdiction of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei City cluster,Yangtze River Delta City cluster,Chengdu-Chongqing City cluster and the middle reaches of Yangtze River City cluster during2019-2021.Based on this,the connectivity levels of these provinces and cities in the three years are measured and analyzed.The calculation and analysis show that the development of inland waterway navigation has the greatest restriction on the connectivity level of urban agglomeration.From 2019 to 2021,the connectivity level of logistics infrastructure of provinces and cities is stable,and the connectivity level of Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration is the best among the four major urban agglomerations.（2）In view of the defects of the assumption of complete rationality of game participants in the traditional game,the evolutionary game theory is introduced,and the core city,non-core city and government within the urban agglomeration are assumed to be the subject of limited rational game.The two-party evolutionary game model among core cities and the three-party evolutionary game model among government,core city and non-core city are constructed respectively.The stability analysis of the two-party game is carried out by taking Nanjing and Hangzhou in the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration as the game subjects,and the three-party game stability analysis is carried out by taking the government and Shanghai Port and Ningbo-Zhoushan Port in the Yangtze River Delta port group as the game subjects.The game results show that there are only two kinds of evolutionarily stable strategy combinations（cooperation,cooperation）and（competition,competition）.The strategy selection of the three-party game influences each other,and the strategy combination has randomness.There will be no strategy selection（supervision,competition,no following）in the three-party game strategy combination.（3）The instability point,initial willingness,parametersA₁,A₂,B₁,B₂,P₁,P₂ in the two-party game model of logistics infrastructure construction in urban agglomeration and parameters C,J,R,P in the three-party game model are simulated and analyzed by MATLAB platform,to analyze the influence of parameter value changes on the final strategy selection of game players.The final simulation analysis results show that the final strategy selection of participants will be adjusted with the change of other participants’strategies,and will also be affected by the change of initial intention and different parameters.