Research On The Influence Of Incentive And Constraint Mechanism On The Expenditure Bias Of Basic Public Services

since the reform of the tax exchange system in 1994 formed an institutional model of fiscal distribution,in this respect the system of economic incentives and the system of political incentives continued to achieve rapid economic development,which led to the "Chinese miracle of economic growth".but with a "dual incentive," municipalities achieve regional economic growth and encourage a shift in the costs of "difficult development,easy livelihoods." It is especially important to pay attention to the needs of the social population based on the needs of that time,as the economy gradually evolves from rapid growth to qualitative development.Make scientific decisions and improve the efficiency of public procurement,ensuring the effectiveness of basic public services for the lives of the population.Therefor correcting the distortion of public procurement is the basis for ensuring economic efficiency.Improving the efficiency of public procurement is a guarantee of the efficiency of operations.Based on the actual situation of China,this paper constructs an evolutionary model with central government and local government as participants,and proposes two hypotheses through the analysis of the theoretical model.Hypothesis 1 is that,under the influence of political centralization,the promotion incentive and constraint mechanism of the central government has a negative effect on the local government’s expenditure on basic public services.However,hypothesis 2 is that there is a nonlinear relationship between the central government’s financial incentives dominated by transfer payments and the local government’s spending bias on basic public services,and the incentive effect is weak.Then,by introducing the mechanism affecting the incentive and constraint effect of local basic public service expenditure bias,it illustrates that the Chinese-style incentive and constraint mechanism has an important impact on the local government’s basic public service expenditure behavior,which mainly focuses on the promotion and transfer payment of officials.Through the analysis of the current situation,it is found that there are problems such as unsound incentive and constraint mechanism,insufficient scale of basic public services and unreasonable structure.Then,the hypothesis proposed by the theoretical model was verified by the provincial panel data,and it was found that the official promotion mechanism would "dissimilate" the local government behavior to some extent,making the local government prefer to spend on non-basic public services,which was more obvious in western regions than in eastern regions.At the same time,the fiscal incentive represented by transfer payment also has an inhibitory effect on the local government’s basic public service expenditure bias,which indicates that transfer payment has not effectively played its "economic incentive" role.Through the central-local evolutionary game model and provincial panel data,the two incentive mechanisms are verified to have defects,and their correction effect on the local government’s basic public service expenditure bias is not obvious.Therefore,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions,including: first,improve the assessment mechanism of local government officials.It is necessary to build a reasonable assessment mechanism to meet the needs of social development,coordinate the gap between regions,and pay attention to the natural orientation in the process of basic public service expenditure.Second,we will improve the transfer payment system.A reasonable transfer payment system should aim at the equalization of basic public services and improve the efficiency of the use of financial funds.Third,improve the political and fiscal restraint mechanism.We will appropriately divide spending responsibilities and raise the level of urbanization.