The Impact Of Regional Tax Competition On Industrial Transfer

In 2018,after the integrated development of the Yangtze River Delta region rose to the national strategic height,the urban layout and spatial structure in the region continued to be optimized and improved.Among them,promoting industrial upgrading and transfer is the most important part of the process of regional integration in the Yangtze River Delta.The economic development in the Yangtze River Delta has been imbalanced for a long time,and the level of local economic development is different.This difference will lead to conflicts of interest when industrial division and cooperation between different regions occur,thus hindering the smooth progress of regional integration.Therefore,how to coordinate the relationship between different regions,realize resource sharing and complement each other’s advantages has become one of the urgent problems to be solved.By actively promoting industrial transfer,various factors of production in the region can be effectively coordinated and the economic gap between regions can be narrowed.Therefore,guiding the formation of benign tax competition has an important impact on the regional industrial transfer and upgrading.Therefore,this paper takes tax competition as the research object,and analyzes the specific effect and impact of tax competition on industrial transfer.Through theoretical research,we can deeply understand the relationship between tax competition and industrial transfer.Specifically,we can explore it from the perspective of fiscal decentralization theory,local government tax competition theory and other perspectives.Tax competition is not only a direct driving force,but also can have an important impact on industrial transfer through various factors such as capital,labor,means of production and production technology.Secondly,it analyzes the current situation of tax competition and industrial transfer in the Yangtze River Delta region from 2017 to 2021 and the composition of industries in the Yangtze River Delta region.Through empirical research,select the relevant data of 41 cities in the Yangtze River Delta from 2017-2021,and use the fixed effect panel model to explore how the tax competition in the Yangtze River Delta affects the development of industrial transfer.Through theoretical research and empirical analysis,we can draw the following conclusions:(1)There is fierce tax competition among local governments in the Yangtze River Delta region,and the higher the degree of this competition,the greater the impact on industrial transfer;(2)The study found that when the tax burden of value-added tax and corporate income tax is at 1% level,there is a significant negative correlation between them and industrial transfer,which indicates that the increase of tax burden will inhibit the industrial transfer between regions;(3)With the continuous development of the economy,the improvement of infrastructure will also be improved,which is more conducive to attracting more industry inflows.Relatively backward cities in the Yangtze River Delta often have low economic development level and infrastructure needs to be improved,which is not conducive to the transfer of industries,but may also lead to the outflow of enterprises.According to theoretical and empirical analysis,this paper believes that a reasonable local tax system can be established to reduce the tax burden of enterprises within the scope of laws and regulations,so as to attract the inflow of enterprises.Secondly,we can formulate differentiated tax policies,gradually cancel the preferential tax policies of developed cities such as Shanghai and Hangzhou in the Yangtze River Delta region,and tilt the preferential tax policies to the less developed regions in the Yangtze River Delta region,so as to promote the economic development of relatively backward regions.At the same time,we can establish a reasonable tax benefit sharing mechanism and a regional industry tax compensation mechanism,determine the tax sharing proportion of the industry transfer in and out,and reduce the tax competition between governments.