"Manager-Employee" Salary Gap,Market Competition And Enterprise Innovation Output

From the prevalence of "egalitarianism" to the policy of limiting the salary of executives with "sky-high remuneration",the thought-provoking question is: in the environment of increasingly fierce market competition,what effect does the salary gap between senior executives and ordinary employees bring to enterprises? Is it motivation or inhibition?This topic has not yet been settled in academia.With the proposal of "Mass Entrepreneurship,Mass Innovation",my country’s innovation strength,especially innovation output capacity,has been continuously improved,which has created a good environment for the innovation and development of enterprises.Therefore,how to reasonably control the "manager-employee" salary gap according to the external market competition environment to improve its own innovation output strength has become an urgent problem to be solved.Under such a background,combined with relevant literature,principal-agent theory,tournament theory and behavior theory,taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as the research sample,this paper mainly discusses the relationship between "manager member" salary gap and enterprise innovation output,as well as the regulatory role of market competition between the above two.The specific conclusions are as follows: This paper selects A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as the research sample,and combined with relevant literature and theories,mainly discusses the relationship between "manager employee" salary gap and enterprise innovation output,as well as the regulatory effect of market competition.The results show that:(1)there is a positive correlation between the "manager member" salary gap and the quantity and quality of innovation;(2)The positive regulation effect of market competition is only reflected in the relationship between the "manager employee" salary gap and the quantity of enterprise innovation.In the relationship between the "manager employee" salary gap and the quality of innovation,market competition has no significant regulation effect;(3)By decomposing the relationship between "manager employee" pay gap and enterprise innovation output,it is found that both executive pay premium and employee pay premium can significantly promote the quality of enterprise innovation,but only executive pay premium can improve the quantity of innovation;At the same time,from the grouping regression of the regulatory role of market competition,when the degree of market competition is strong,the "manager member" salary gap of non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises with strong financing constraints and enterprises in the growth stage plays a stronger role in promoting the number of enterprise innovation.The characteristics of this study include the following two aspects: on the one hand,this paper studies the relationship between "manager employee" salary gap and enterprise innovation output from the perspective of market competition,and divides enterprise innovation output into innovation quantity and innovation quality for comparative study;On the other hand,this paper discusses whether there are differences in the regulatory effect of the external environmental factor of market competition under different company characteristics,which complements the relevant research on the relationship between "manager member" salary gap,market competition and enterprise innovation output,and enriches the tournament theory..