Project Performance Evaluation And Optimization Of YG Enterprises From The Perspective Of Organization-level PMO

With the launch of China’s "the Belt and Road" initiative,Chinese enterprises have been encouraged to "go global",and have jointly established an alliance network based on technical standards cooperation with organizations along the "the Belt and Road",that is,an alliance network of enterprise technical standards oriented to the "the Belt and Road",which has promoted the process of China’s high-quality joint construction of standards along the "the Belt and Road".The alliance network is of great significance to the consolidation of Chinese enterprises in the "the Belt and Road" market and the transformation and upgrading of local industrial chains.Therefore,studying the cooperation willingness of the alliance network is helpful to understand and master the achievement and actual operation of the alliance cooperation,which has certain practical reference value for Chinese enterprises to achieve efficient "going global" and then dominate the markets along the "the Belt and Road".For the research on the willingness to cooperate in the alliance network,the paper uses the leader-follower consistency model of social network analysis,evolutionary game model and case analysis to study it.First,1256 effective samples of technical standards cooperation projects along the "the Belt and Road" were collected,analyzed and summarized through literature mining,and then three network characteristics,namely alliance network size,structure and leader position,were extracted by using qualitative text analysis.On this basis,the corresponding value of alliance cooperation willingness was further calculated,The numerical values are compared and analyzed.Secondly,in the technological standards cooperation of manufacturing industries along the "the Belt and Road",the game of enterprises based on technological innovation upgrading is not only closely related to the survival and development of enterprises,but also affects the stability of the alliance.Based on the evolutionary game method from a dynamic perspective,this paper studies the technology strategy choice and cooperation willingness of Chinese manufacturing enterprises and local suppliers in different situations.The basic game between Chinese manufacturing enterprises and local suppliers as well as the game model considering innovation risk and government subsidies have been constructed successively,and the influence of factors such as technology generation difference,innovation subsidies and degree of synergy on the evolution of the alliance’s willingness to cooperate and the stability of enterprise strategy has been analyzed.Finally,by studying typical cases of five scenarios and micro scenarios in the alliance network,we compare and analyze the corresponding driving factors of cooperation willingness,and further empirically test the research conclusions.The research results show that: first,the alliance network scenarios based on the practical situation of Chinese enterprises include five types: center divergence,coexistence and symbiosis,principal-agent,group sailing and interconnection.Through in-depth comparison and analysis of the willingness to cooperate under various network scenarios,it can be seen that under the local manufacturing network scenario,the willingness of Chinese enterprise leaders to cooperate is stronger,while the willingness of alliances led by local suppliers is weaker;Under the principal-agent network scenario,the cooperation willingness of the main leadership alliances along the "the Belt and Road" is weak;Under the industrial chain network scenario,the main leading alliance close to the middle of the industrial chain has a stronger willingness to cooperate;For the interconnection network,no matter which enterprise is the leader,the willingness to cooperate is the same;The Chinese enterprise leadership alliance has the strongest willingness to cooperate under the network scenario of group going to sea.Secondly,the innovation subsidy coefficient of Chinese manufacturing enterprises and local governments,the degree of innovation synergy between Chinese manufacturing enterprises and local suppliers,and the technology gap are important factors that affect the evolution balance of the alliance;Based on the different situations formed by the above factors,the system presents four stabilization strategies.In addition,under different conditions,various factors have different effects on the strategic choice and cooperation willingness of Chinese manufacturing enterprises and local suppliers.Correspondingly,first of all,the innovation subsidy of Chinese manufacturing enterprises can promote both enterprises to choose the collaborative innovation strategy of technology,but the innovation subsidy coefficient reaches a certain degree,which will affect the innovation behavior of Chinese manufacturing enterprises.Secondly,the increase of the innovation subsidy coefficient of the local government will significantly enhance the willingness of both enterprises to cooperate in technological innovation.Then,the higher the degree of innovation synergy between the two sides,the better the choice of technological collaborative innovation behavior between enterprises.Finally,the technology difference between Chinese manufacturing enterprises and local suppliers will lead to the difference of enterprise innovation behavior.Third,the driving factors of the cooperation willingness of the enterprise technology standards alliance network facing the "the Belt and Road" are diversified and showing dynamic changes.Through in-depth discussion and study of the project through case analysis,we can draw the conclusion that network characteristics,resource factors and economic and social factors will affect the willingness to cooperate in the whole process of project construction and operation.In view of the impact of the above factors,in order to regulate the behavior of alliance members,the management system of the "the Belt and Road" standards alliance has been built from the three dimensions of "jointly discussing,jointly building and sharing" :(1)building the technical standards coordination mechanism of the alliance;(2)Establishing the benefit distribution mechanism of the alliance;(3)Improve the technology standard sharing mechanism of the alliance;(4)Build the technical standard security mechanism of the alliance to improve the overall cooperation willingness of the alliance and maintain the stability of the system.