Study On Cargo Capacity Sharing Strategy For Online Freight Platform Based On Fair Revenue Allocation

In the new era of online freight stepping into the booming platform economy,expanding the scale of vehicle and cargo sources and improving the efficiency of vehicle-cargo matching is a top priority for many online freight companies.Since the implementation of the Interim Measures for the Management of Road Cargo Transport Operations on Online Platforms,the number of online freight platforms has increased rapidly,with a marked polarization.2020 ranked top ten companies in the top and bottom of the scale of capacity difference of hundreds of times,and 2021,although there is a moderate but also tens of times difference.As competition intensifies,small-and-medium-sized platforms face the risk of continued displacement or even withdrawal from the market.And while the platform economy is booming,the important role of interconnection in the development of digital platform markets has attracted widespread attention.Therefore,interconnection in the freight industry and implementation of capacity sharing may achieve a win-win situation.However,in the process of platform interconnection establishment,revenue allocation is a sensitive topic that needs to be urgently addressed to achieve both capacity sharing among platforms and equity.Based on Hotelling model and Shapley value method,this paper proposes a revenue allocation scheme under the capacity sharing strategy in a fair perspective.Firstly,in the context of interconnection strategy,this paper proposes a capacity sharing strategy for the important dependence of open online freight platforms on capacity and cargo information,and based on the Hotelling model,the strategy is analyzed by introducing a capacity factor,and it is concluded that the profit gained by the platform when capacity is shared is all higher than that in the case of no sharing.Secondly,the revenue allocation model of the online freight platform is constructed under the perspective of equity,and the revenue allocation model based on Shapley’s value is initially constructed.Then,to address the problems of single factor and unreasonable results,the Shapley value-based revenue allocation model and the bargaining dynamic game based revenue allocation incentive model are revised from the perspective of fair incentive to obtain the revenue of both parties.For the determination of the actual contribution,the factors affecting the revenue distribution are first summarized from the perspective of the participating subjects(users and platform)of the platform capacity sharing,and the index system of the factors affecting the revenue distribution of the capacity sharing strategy is initially constructed.Then,through questionnaire survey and analysis of relevant indicators,the DEMATEL-ISM method is used to screen key influencing factors and arrive at the final key indicator system affecting revenue allocation,and finally determine the indicator coefficients and their reasonable scientificity.Finally,the fairness and rationality of the three allocation schemes are tested by cases.The calculation results show that the revenue allocation results based on actual contribution and the allocation scheme based on dynamic game modification are more fair and just than the traditional Shapley value method,and the revenue allocation incentive model based on bargaining dynamic game modification is more applicable to the cooperation of platforms with comparable capacity(status)or little difference,while the scheme based on actual contribution modification is more applicable to the cooperation of platforms with large difference in capacity(status),and is proposed from the perspective of government and enterprises respectively.