| "The people take food as the sky,and food is the first priority." The food industry is facing a complex environment,from "farmland to table" potential risks,"soil pit" sauerkraut and other food quality and safety incidents have once again hit consumers’ confidence in food quality and safety.How to ensure food quality and safety has become an urgent matter that restricts the healthy development of China’s food industry.This paper adopts distorted risk measurement and evolutionary game methods to study the risk evaluation and control of food quality and safety in China at this stage.The main research content and conclusions of this paper are as follows.(1)Quality and safety risk assessment of food supply chain: divide the food supply chain into four links: planting and breeding,production and processing,storage and transportation,sales and consumption,and construct a risk evaluation index system.According to the characteristics of small probability and large loss of food quality and safety incidents,the distortion risk measurement in the actuarial field is introduced,the index risk loss value is measured,and the index weight is determined by the combined weighting method to measure the food quality and safety risk level in China from 2016 to 2021.The evaluation results show that at this stage,China’s food quality and safety risks are generally stable and good,but there are fluctuations.Further risk the key issues in food quality and safety risks and find out the influencing factors.It is found that proactive food quality and safety risk control by stakeholders in the food supply chain is the key to preventing and controlling food quality and safety risks.(2)Food supply chain quality and safety risk control issues: identify the main stakeholders in food quality and safety risk control,and focus on analyzing the interaction between food-related enterprises and governments in quality and safety risk control.According to the principle of risk sharing and benefit sharing,raw material suppliers and food manufacturers are considered to carry out food quality and safety risk control,construct an evolutionary game model of food quality and safety risk control input,and analyze the impact of cost and benefit on collaborative cooperation for food quality and safety risk control input.Model reasoning shows that a reasonable benefit and cost allocation mechanism is the key to achieving synergy.Further thinking about the role of government macro-control in enterprise behavior decision-making,it is found that when the input and output of risk control are relatively small,government subsidies can effectively motivate enterprises to participate in risk control input,and the larger the subsidy value,the more significant the incentive effect.When the input and output of risk control are relatively large,the government should establish a punishment mechanism to restrain the "free rider" behavior of enterprises,but the restraint is effective only when the fine reaches a certain amount. |
