Research On Cooperation Mechanism Of Enterprises’ Quality And Safety In Food Supply Chain And Its Risk Control

This article investigated on some problems of the upstream and downstream enterprises of the food supply chain under the three different forms of cooperation based on the neoclassic economics and game theory method. These problems include the effectiveness of the quality and safety efforts, the profits, the effect of the losses that the food safety incidents caused on the quality efforts’ efficacy, the social welfare comparison, etc. Meanwhile, we constructed evolutionary game model to analyze the macro and micro factors that influenced the cooperation strategy, and demonstrated the effect of diversity of decision-making parameters on evolution results based on numerical simulation. And analysised the quality and safety risk evolution mechanism of food supply chain from four links. This article empirically analyzed the sources of risk from three aspects which were the links that produced the quality and safety risk of food supply chain, the factors that constituted the quality and safety risk of food supply chain and the the subjects of liability that involved the quality and safety risk of food supply chain based on food safety events datas which were processed and put forward " double layers of structure " of the risk formation mechanism. We analysed the quality and safety risk formation mechanism of food supply chain form two aspects which were market risk and credit risk. We tried to explore and constuct the incentive constracts mechanism of controlling the creditrisk and the quality and safety signaling game mechanism of controlling market risk on the above basis, and provide theoretical basis for preventing and controling the risk factors effectively which endanger the quality and safety of food supply chain and reduce the probability of food safety incidents.The research results as follow:(1) The food supply chain form that cooperates both on the quality, safety and pricing can achieve the high quality efforts efficiency and obtain high profits simultaneously in the conditions of three kinds of cooperation modalities, which are noncooperation, semi cooperation and cooperation.(2) The interaction between the loss that the average quality and safety events of per unit food caused each time and the quality efforts marginal cost can influence the upstream and downstream enterprises’ quality efforts effectiveness. The loss that the food quality and safety events caused has a vital impact on the enterprises’ quality efforts efficiency. There is a negative correlation between the quality efforts efficiency and the loss when the degree of quality efforts is higher, and instead there is a positive correlation between them.(3) The direct consequence of enterprises in pursuit of maximum profit is that they will reduce the total investment in quality efforts. But increasing the discount value of the enterprise future earnings can promote the enterprises to cooperate on quality and safety, and enhance mutual trust, establish long-term strategic cooperation partnership, and work hard for creating excellent cooperation environment for the quality and safety in the food supply chain. (4) The macro environment will be the important basis for the enterprises’ decision-making on collaboration strategy. (5) In recent years, the quality and safety risk of food supply chain generally presented a declining trend, and its level was tending to turn for the better. (6) The formation of the quality and safety risk of food supply chain has double layer structure evolution characteristics, and the credit risk caused by the parternership between the main bodies was not close enough laid in the inner circle, the market risk caused by the consumers adverse selection behavior that caused by the existence of information asymmetry laid in the outside circle. (7) It can effectively prevent, avoid and control market risk through building a reasonable and effective quality and safety signaling game mechanism which can constraint the participants (consumers) adverse selection behavior. (8) It can promote the long-term stable cooperation development between the main bodies, enhance cooperation closeness, and encourage parterners to pay more quality and safety efforts, ensure the supply of quality and safety products, effectively prevent, avoid and control credit risk through building a reasonable and effective incentive contract constraint mechanism to restrain the participants opportunism behavior.