The sudden outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 made the market demand for emergency products such as masks and disinfectants surge in the short term,and the stability of the supply chain was reduced or even broken.Supply chain emergency management has been increasingly concerned.Public demand for emergency supplies increases dramatically in a short period of time as a result of public emergencies,which undoubtedly raises the requirements for production capacity,product quality control and supply chain reliability of enterprises of the supply chain.Manufacturers,as exporters of products,need to reach cooperative relations with third-party manufacturers for joint production due to their limited production capacity,so as to achieve short-term increase in product supply.As a direct participant of the market,retailers are faced with risks such as quality problems and delivery delays caused by increased production in a short period of time,so reliability investment becomes an effective measure to reduce risks.In order to study the optimal cooperative production mode between manufacturer and third-party manufacturer and the reliabilit investment mode that can maximize the overall benefits of three parties in the supply chain,an evolutionary game model composed of manufacturer,third-party manufacturer and retailer is constructed in this thesis.First,a costs-risk-sharing mechanism between manufacturers and third-party manufacturers and a the static reliability investment mechanism of retailers have been established to explore the stable strategies of the three groups in different demand disruption stages.The influence of multiple factors,such as the degree of demand disruption and reliability investment coefficient,on the evolution of supply chain member strategy in different demand disruption stages has been studied.Secondly,establish a dynamic reliability investment mechanism of retailers,explores the dynamic adjustment of retailers’ reliability investment strategy according to supply chain coordination in different demand disruption stages,and studies the mutual influence of strategies between manufacturers and retailers,so as to achieve the choice of reliability investment strategy with the highest incentive degree under limited resources.The results show that :(1)the degree of demand disruption will affect the evolution of the strategies of the three participants in the supply chain in different stable directions;(2)According to different demand disruption stages,the combination of dynamic and static reliability investment can achieve better effect of improving supply reliability;(3)Reducing the cost-sharing ratio of manufacturers at the initial stage of demand disruption can effectively promote complete cooperation between manufacturers and third-party manufacturers.This study provides a more realistic and comprehensive decision-making scheme for supply chain emergency collaborative production under sudden demand disruption caused by emergencies,which helps to enrich the modern supply chain emergency decision-making theory. |