Innovate The Modern State From The Local Government

The traditional theories of local government behavior pay special attention to state-center, bureaucrat hierarchy, local competition, and other factors. Instead, this paper argues that such studies cannot explain the diversity of local innovation and its evolution process. From local governance theory, local governments are constrained simultaneously by horizontal and vertical dimensions in the power structure, namely, the state-society and the center-local relations. Based on the decentralization of China and local governance theory, this paper develops the theoretical framework of’power structure under non-coordinate constraint’to explain the generation and evolution of Chinese local government innovation, and reveal the unique features and internal logic of state building and governance transformation in China.This paper attempts to answer these questions:First, how does it bring about the flexible local innovation in the context of one-party authoritarianism? How does power structure change influence the local innovation? Second, how does it form the diversity of local innovation in the unitary system of China? How much is the differentiation formed based on the power structure under non-coordinate constraint? Third, from the perspectives of local governance or state-building theories, why the local innovation traps into an unsustainable dilemma? As a result, the local governance theory as the consequences of modernity interweaved the traditional topic of political power. And it supplies some new arguments to understand the question of state-building.1. The author argues that the Chinese power structure has changed a lot since the past30years of Chinese Reform, and it contributes to the rise of local innovation. On the vertical dimension, the Chinese decentralization brought about the expansion of local governance and inspired local governments to initiate a lot of policy innovations. But local governments are still under the constraints of central authority. On the horizontal dimension, this distinctive power structure has taken shape from the interaction between the state’s embeddedness and the social anti-embeddedness. Social demands also stimulate the generation of local innovations. Therefore, under these constraints of the dual power centers, the local innovation is characterized by interdependent and uncertain.2. The diversity of local innovation is closely related to the degree of co-ordination in the Chinese power structure. Based on the analysis of Chinese Local Government Innovations Awards winners of the past five rounds, especially comparing with the two cases of Sichuan and Zhejiang, the paper finds that the lower level of coordination, the more unstable innovation, and vice versa. On the horizontal dimension, in the initial stage of innovation, the differentiations of marketization and social structure cause the unequal coordination between the state’s embeddedness and social anti-embeddedness. On the vertical dimension, in the diffusion of innovations, the varying levels of non-coordination between central-local relations lead to the different innovation outcomes. Therefore, these remold different innovations and the diffuse ranges in Sichuan and Zhejiang provinces.3. The non-coordination of power structure results in the innovative involution. The paper describes this dilemma as "involution". It means that there is some new reform but its essence and mechanism do not change at all. Then, this paper states the reasons for the involution. The governmental innovation is restrained by the particular systematic bureaucracy, which forms the Closed-clientelist hierarchy. This particular system also excludes the request of society and leads to the innovative involution at last.The last chapter discusses the theoretical and practical significance of local government innovation for China’s transition and state-building. The innovative involution reflects inherent contradictions of the Chinese power structure. China’s governance needs decentralization and the state-society cooperation to complete. On the contrary, it is virtually under the control of the state, with the society playing only a limited role. As a result, on the one hand, a lot of innovations are brought out to overcome the shortcomings of the old system. On the other hand, these innovations are invalid, exacerbating the social crisis. The involution illustrates that the bureaucracy technology governance is very limited. At the same time, the non-coordination power structure proves the profound contradictions between the consolidated authority and the state’s legitimacy for Chinese state-building. The purpose of this paper is to choose proper approaches for the goal of building modern state in China. Therefore, to make the goal come true, besides the institution building, we should pay more attention to the social initiative participation and autonomy.