Research On Game Models For Realization Paths In Low Carbon Supply Chains Of Electronics Industry

Since the20century, along with the worldwide rapid development, the problem of GHG emissions from electronics industry has received more and more attention. For electronics industry, carbon emissions mainly come from the manufacturing process of electronics components and the use of electronic products, and electronic producer is the key to control the carbon emissions of the supply chain. Thus, in order to realize a low carbon supply chain and reduce carbon emissions of electronics industry, governments in developed countries have formulated policies, regulations and standards to exert pressures on electronic producers to reduce carbon emissions; and producers further influence their upstream and downstream supply chain members to take carbon emission reduction actions. As a pillar industry of our national economy, the Chinese electronics industry has been developed under the pressures of resources scarcity and environmental pollution. Subsequently, the Chinese government has gradually paid attention to the carbon emission issue of electronics industry, and tried to resolve the problem by take actions such as legislations. However, such effort has made a low progress due to the influence of economic and technological aspects. Therefor, it is necessary to explore the key issues for realization paths of a low carbon supply chain of the Chinese electronics industry. Based on summarizing previous research results and analyzing the realization paths of a low carbon supply chain of electronics industry, this dissertation identifies the key issues and establishes mathematical models.Firstly, a game model between governments and producers in the process of a low carbon supply chain is established. In China, most electronic producers are currently reluctant to engage in taking carbon emission reduction actions, and they must be encouraged through financial subsidies provided by governments. Governments’measures aiming at motivating producers evolves overtime, and the information asymmetry problem exists between governments and producers. Thus, an evolutionary game model based on governments’ inspection policy (governments’inspection of the situation of electronic producers’carbon emission reduction) between local governments and electronic producers is established. The evolutionary game model analyzes different evolutionary stable strategies, and explores the behavior traits of local governments and electronic producers. Also, the necessity of establishing carbon related local supporting regulations and standards as well as developing a feasible supervision mechanism is discussed. The model above can aid the decision making for both governments and producers in low carbon supply chain management, and provide reference for subsequent studies on how governments promoting electronic producers to take actions on low carbon supply chain management. Secondly, a model for low carbon supplier evaluation and selection as well as a game model of joint carbon emission reduction between producers and suppliers are developed. Considering cost, quality, service level and carbon emissions of supplier’s product as the selection criteria, this dissertation adopts fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (fuzzy AHP) to evaluate the relative importance of multiple criteria and fuzzy Goal Programming (fuzzy GP) to solve the order quantity allocation problem, and prove the applicability of such model by illustrative examples. Under the problem of carbon emission reduction cooperation by producers and suppliers, this dissertation establishes different contracts to analyze joint implementation of carbon emission reduction and compare the results of supply chain profit and carbon emission reduction level of the product under different contracts. The models above can provide decision support for producers to collaborate with suppliers to reduce carbon emissions of the supply chain.Finally, the research establishes a game model of joint carbon emission reduction between producers and retailers, and analyzes the influence of supply chain competition for cooperation. Based on the consideration of consumers’ low-carbon preference that affects the market demand, this research establishes three contracts to analyze cooperative ways of carbon emission reduction between producers and downstream retailers. Furthermore, a supply chain competition model is established to analyze the influence of supply chain competition for cooperation. The models established above can provide decision support for producers to collaborate effectively with retailers and reduce carbon emissions of the product.