Research On Supply And Matching Of Electric Vehicle Charging Service

As an important tool to achieve energy-saving and emission reduction in traffic area, electric vehicles’(EVs) market promotion has attracted global attention. Although EVs shows a large-scale promotion trend, the challenges still remain. Among them, the relatively immature battery and the charging technology and incomplete charging service have been outstanding factors hindering the popularization of EVs. Moreover, as representative problems of charging service development, insufficient charging service supply and loss of service operation mechanism makes the shortages of battery and charging technology more prominent. Speeding up the development of charging service is not only the key problem of EVs development in the current, but also a prospective problem in protect the normal operation for large-scale EVs market in the future.Basing on the background and problem oriented, this paper starts from ecological system composed of EVs, charging infrastructures and charging service markets. Market-oriented mechanism design for EVs charging service including supply and operation is studied based on existing related researches. The study enriches the theoretical research results of charging infrastructure development mechanism and charging service operation mechanism under special goal, and also provides reference in practice.Firstly, the construction subject of charging infrastructure is discussed based on the basic economic attribute analysis. From the prospective of Potter competition model including complementary products and payment of game model between EVs users and charging infrastructure operators, construction of charging infrastructure is necessary and urgent. The analysis of using process of charging infrastructure shows that spillover effects on power grid and other load operation are produced, which indicates that charging infrastructure is a quasi-public goods. And case analysis based on project distinguishing theory and improved operation coefficient model shows that charging infrastructure has significant quasi-operating characteristics. However, the characteristics of quasi-public goods and quasi-operating can be changed with technical progress and relevant price and subsidy policy. The basic economic attributes and input-output effect analysis show that charging infrastructure construction needs the common participation of government and market. And game analysis also shows that support of government is of great necessity for the market to carry out construction. Therefore, diversification subject strategy of government support and market construction and corresponding investment and financing mode for charging infrastructure are proposed.Secondly, demand side maximum matching of fast charging service market is studied based on bipartite graph theory, and demand side collective optimal and maximum matching mechanism of fast charging service market is then designed to reach the efficiency goal of market allocation of resources. In this paper, a round of charging service operation between EVs and charging infrastructures is abstracted as a bipartite graph matching problem, and then maximum market allocation of resources in equivalent to the maximum matching of a bipartite graph matching. Then demand side maximum matching model is established and demand side maximum matching mechanism is build based on the Hall Marriage Theorem. Further, collective rationality hypothesis which is represented by time preference and cost preference is introduced in the demand side collective optimal and maximum matching based on weighted maximum or minimum bipartite graph matching theory. Case study shows that demand side collective optimal and maximum matching has good efficiency of market allocation of resources on the hand of ‘well and fatly’ achieving matching.Third, individual rational and incentive compatible goals are introduced in the individual optimal Nash equilibrium matching on demand side of fast charging service market based on maximum marching and non-cooperative game equilibrium theory, and stable matching of fast charging service market is studied when the whole market is individually rationality based on stable matching theory of cooperation game. Aiming at the ‘unilateral rational market’ in which only EV users is individually rationality, complete information static game model on demand side of charging service market is bullied based on EV users’ utility function, and then individual optimal Nash equilibrium on demand side of charging service market is constructed with Hall condition. The final matching scheme of the Nash equilibrium mechanism, which not only can achieve the goal of efficient market allocation but also meets the individual rational and incentive compatible goal on demand side, is a Pareto optimal solution. Then further technology and economy analysis of circumstance of individual rationality on supply side is taken, and then stable matching of charging service market is designed for ‘bilateral rational market’ situation based on utility function and deferred acceptance mechanism under strict preference hypothesis. The final solution of stable matching mechanism, which also not only can achieve the goal of efficient market allocation but also meets the individual rational and incentive compatible goal for both demand and supply sides, is a Pareto optimal solution, too. Case analysis shows that both the two matching of fast charging service market have good performance in meeting targets of market resource allocation efficiency, individual rationality and incentive compatible.Finally, game decision mechanism of optimum starting charging time for EV users is studied with the introduction of individual rationality based on dynamic use-of –time pricing model and non-cooperative game equilibrium theory, and then individual optimal equilibrium mechanism on demand side of conventional charging service market is designed. Based on mathematically modeling the charging behavior of EVs’ conventional charging service and dynamic use-of –time pricing model, connection between EVs, charging infrastructures and grid is constructed. Thus a game model of conventional charge service between EV users is constructed based on the optimal cost model. Then individual optimal equilibrium mechanism on demand side of conventional charging service market is established based on the solution of the optimal cost model. Case study also shows that individual optimal equilibrium mechanism on demand side of conventional charging service market has good performance in meeting promotion of economic operation of the grid and reduction of charging service cost.