| In China’s commercial real estate industry, the lack of experience in location choice and long-term consideration and the blind development of commercial real estate projects driven by short-term profits for developers and local governments have led to the irrational distribution, structural imbalance and serious homogenization of commercial real estate location. Moreover, local governments’ pursuit of political performance and requirement for resolving "financial hunger" have refueled the blind development of commercial real estate and exacerbated the risks of regional bubbles. The current commercial real estate location distribution is the result of developers’ free location choice and local governments’ "land finance" and local officials’ "promotion championship". Therefore, the commercial real estate distribution and choice, as well as the attraction of real estate developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice in 31 provinces and cities in China were discussed in this paper from the perspective of balanced development of regional economy.To illustrate the attraction of real estate developers and local governments during the process of commercial real estate location choice, the real estate developer attraction model and local government attraction model of commercial real estate location choice were introduced in this paper. Once the major factors affecting China’s commercial real estate location choice were determined, the evaluation index system of the commercial real estate location choice was set up. Firstly, two affecting factors of attraction were defined in the attraction model: the attraction of developers is mainly affected by the natural attraction and market attraction, while that of local governments is mainly affected by the socio-economic attraction and ecological environment attraction. Secondly, in conjunction with the space measurement model and the panel data measurement theory and taking into account the spatial unit correlation and time scale correlation, a new integrated attraction model was designed, and the detailed analyses of commercial real estate location choice in 31 provinces in China were made by a method integrating qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis, comparative analysis, comprehensive analysis and logic induction to derive the attraction coefficients of developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice. Finally, according to the coefficients of the attraction of developers and local governments for the investment in commercial real estate and through the analysis of the differences in attraction, the roles of the attraction of developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice and the spatial patterns of commercial real estate location choice from the perspective of dual attraction were further analyzed in this paper.According to the dual attraction model of the commercial real estate location choice, the attraction coefficients of developers are greater than those of local governments, indicating that developers have stronger wishes or intents in commercial real estate location choice; meanwhile, with the exception of Tibet, the attraction role of the local governments of 30 provinces was greater than that of developers, which is the result of the decision or strength wrestling between developer attraction and local government attraction in commercial real estate location choice and well aligned with the current system of local governments in China, indicating that, in the "land finance-led" context, commercial real estate development has been the enthusiasm of local governments, which is also an institutional factor contributing to the present overheated investment in commercial real estate. This suggests that developers and local governments have reached a tacit understanding or consensus during the game, and the phenomenon that local governments are "captured" or "kidnapped" or "kidnapped" voluntarily by developers exists in China. During the game, the transmission mechanism of developer attraction works with a completely efficacious transmission effect(even transmitting to local governments), while that of local attraction works with partly or even completely invalid transmission effect.From the perspective of dual attraction, commercial real estate location choice is characterized by not only myopic views and negative externality due to developers’ pursuit of profits but also regionalism and blindness due to local governments’ interference through "land finance" and "only GDP theory". Therefore, by shifting from the perspective of micro and local location choice to the perspective of macro-location choice, the effects and limitations of commercial real estate location choice under the perspective of dual attraction were analyzed in this paper. The commercial real estate location choice under the action of the dual attraction is vulnerable to regional imbalance due to the center-perimeter effect and space cumulative causal effects, and given the limitations of the externality of the utilization of location resources and market failure, the sole dual attraction commercial real estate location choice is disadvantageous to the coordinated regional economic development, so the commercial real estate location choice should be guided and managed in a more comprehensive manner. With the macro trend of the micro location factors, location choice process should be shifted from the previous perspective of dual attraction to the perspective of triple attraction(developer attraction, local government attraction and central government attraction). Commercial real estate developers hope to create profits through location choice; local governments hope to promote local economic development and increase local financial revenue through commercial real estate location choice; the central government hopes to promote coordinated regional development and sound development of commercial real estate and increase social well-being through commercial real estate location choice. The commercial real estate location choices conducted by real estate developers and local governments are of limitations and myopic development, and the decision behaviors to a certain extent even cause external diseconomy, while those conducted by the central government focus on long-term goals and overall coordination. The decision behaviors will greatly vary with different positions. From an economic perspective, developers and local governments focus on ways to maximize their benefits, while the central government wants to maximize the social benefits. Therefore, the central government’s macroeconomic control can remedy the weaknesses of current commercial real estate location choice, promote the rational and scientific location choices, combine micro-location choices with macro-location choices and improve the overall benefits of the society.The commercial real estate in this paper mainly refers to the real estate for commercial purpose, that is, the commercial and business buildings, including the commercial properties of shopping malls, markets, the entertainment and catering sector, shopping centers and various forms of commercial streets and wholesale markets. The commercial real estate location choice in this paper mainly refers to the commercial real estate location layout and choice at the national or regional level based on the current situation of commercial real estate in 31 provinces and cities in China rather than the project site choice conducted by developers.The innovations of this paper include: the attraction of developers and local governments in commercial real estate location choice were discussed in this paper for the first time; the developer attraction model and government attraction model and the evaluation index system of the commercial real estate location choice were set up; the ideas, such as "the attraction coefficients of developers are greater than those of local governments in commercial real estate location choice", were put forward in this paper.
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