On Wittgenstein's On Certainty

Moore's refutation of Skeptic's doubt of the existence of the external physical world with'I know that this is a hand' is interesting, while Wittgenstein's remarks on this issue, which has become the book named On Certainty, is more interesting.My thesis begins with Wittgenstein's remarks on Moore and tries to comb the book throughout within several thought strings. The first string(the Chapter 2,4,5,) mainly discusses the invalidation of Moore's refutation and Wittgenstein's analysis concerning Skepticism. Moore and the Skeptic have the same misunderstanding and use "know" and "doubt" metaphysically. Words only have their meanings when being used in the ordinary language games, when it is meaningful to ask 'how do I know?' and 'how to remove my doubt?', and these questions can't be answered in Moore's and the Skeptic's situation. Wittgenstein exposes both Moore and the Skeptic's misunderstanding of words when doing Philosophy. This agrees with Wittgenstein's bringing the words from the metaphysical use down to the ordinary use.The Chapter 3 is the second string:Moore and the Skeptic are prone to treat 'know' and 'doubt' as a mental state which can be evoked anytime they want. In order to clarify this misunderstanding, this chapter will expound the ways Wittgenstein deal with "mental state" and his psychological philosophy.The third string consists in the Chapter 6,7,8. Wittgenstein is interested by the Moorean propositions because these propositions look like absolute truth but meanwhile we can't figure out how can they become truth. They belong to the Certainty. The Chapter 6 shows Wittgenstein's description of the Certainty. His description is idiosyncratic:they(the Certaintiy) can be basic beliefs, form of life and the foundation of people's thinking and action, sometimes they can play a logic role. This idiosyncratic description should be responsible for the disputes among researchers, whose disputes are confusing, instead of clarifying this problem. The Chapter 7 links the Certainty with another concept---he "end" which often appears in Wittgenstein's other writings. Actually, the "end"(for instance, the "end" of interpreting, of justification, of argument, of verification,of doubt) is the Certainty. Certainty are the end of language games, and also the framework of language games. But the reason why the framework keep untouchable is the things within the frame make them stable, not that the framework has some kind of a prior logical status.The Chapter 9, which is the last string, discusses Wittgenstein's anti-foundationalism. Wittgenstein says that the Certainty is the foundation and framework of language games, so researchers often hold that in his final stage Wittgenstein appeals to a new kind of foundationalism. This is a serious misunderstanding. Language games do needs something being stable, but this is not foundationalism, for the former is description while the latter is interpretation. The Certainty is the end of interpretation and has no final justification. The language games are also has no final justification, they are unpredictable, has nothing to do with rationality. Wittgenstein's anti-foundationalism results in his rejecting to offer a foundation for his own philosophy. The logic and praxis are not his philosophy's end or foundation. Wittgenstein has left us his brilliant spiritual heritages, with which we can go on marching and seeing things clearly.