Study On The Village Leaders' Working Behavior Law And Incentive Mechanism

In this dissertation, the author tried to study the law of the village leaders'working behaviors, and then focus on how to motivate the village leaders'enthusiasm in their working activities based on the date collected by a series of surveys.By a new conception of"agent weight", and a new frame work of"weighted agents", the author summarized the changing process of the village leaders'working behaviors and its law by a qualitative and quantitative methods, in addition, pointed out the trend of their working behaviors—to be the villagers'agent, in the Construction of New Socialist Countryside (CNSC for short below). At present, while the villagers'agent weight is 0.85, the government's agent weight is just 0.15. So, in practice, the village leaders are likely to be the villager's agent. Now that, how to motivate the village leaders to supply a better service for their villagers?Firstly, this thesis did an analysis focus on the current state of the village leaders working behaviors, which mainly about their working motivations or targets, working state (e.g. working responsibility state, their main jobs and the weighted agent role which they are playing,working effectiveness, wage expectation and policy demands) . Besides, set up two chapters to do a further analysis about their working motivation sources and working stressors. All of that will give a practical basis for the incentive mechanism design.Secondly, just focus on the incentive effect problem, in the second empirical part; the author did an effectiveness analysis of the current incentive factors by an Ordered Logistics Model, based on the data from Heyang County in 2010. In the econometric analysis, the author employed the concept of"working enthusiasm"as the incentive variable. Based on the idea of process theory in terms of the motivating theory, the author measured the incentive factors contribution to their working enthusiasm. Firstly, from the working status variable (working difficulty) and working result variables (working satisfaction and the voluntary to be a village leaders'continually), measured the incentive factors driving effect from a whole process of the village leaders'working behaviors. Then, by an experiment data, did a further empirical test. Finally, the result shows:①Improving the wage cashing rate and the current wage lever, can significantly increase the village leaders'working satisfaction, reduce their working difficulty assessment, and increase the voluntary of being reappointed;②Strengthening the social reputation mechanism can significantly improve the village leaders'voluntary to be a village leader continually, reduce their working difficulty assessment and improve their working satisfaction;③The efficient operation of the democracy mechanism can increase their working satisfaction and their voluntary to be a village leader continually, and reduce their working difficulty assessment from a long time seeing;④Increasing their opportunities to be a servant in the administration can significantly increase their working enthusiasm;⑤Increasing the training chances , study chances or visiting opportunities as well as the other studying chances, can improve the village leaders'working enthusiasm in the CSNC significantly;⑥The repaired relationsip between the village leaders and villagers, and the mechanism of each government officer in charge of several villagers can reduce the village leaders'working difficulty feelings, thus improve their working enthusiasm in some degree;⑦The punishment mechanism has a negative effect on the village leaders working enthusiasm under the current rural conditions;⑧prolonging the term of office under the reality of low wage cashing rate and wage lever and also lacking of political promotion chances, can not improve their working enthusiasm.Further, the author arranged the village leaders'incentive factors by their incentive effectiveness. The result indicates that:Improving the wage cashing rate and wage level, increasing their career development opportunities (e.g. political promotion opportunities, training chances or other study chances), have the best incentive effect in the poor rural area; The second best incentive factor is the efficient operation of democracy institution, which has a positive effect on the regular rural management and the village leaders'working enthusiasm; Building up a good relationship between the village leaders and villagers, strengthening the reputation mechanism and setting the government officers in charge of several villages, are the thirdly best way to motivating the village leaders. However, prolonging the village leaders'working term does not have any significant incentive effect under the current realities when the wage lever and its cashing rate are still low, no chances of development, and no economic resources and so on. The punishment mechanism has a significant negative effect on the village leaders'working enthusiasm under the current rural conditions.Thirdly, based on a two periods cross-sectional data, using an exploratory factor analysis technique, comparatively studied the village leaders'response to the incentive experimental environment, by this way, the author measured the might effectiveness and its order of different incentive factors in each period. The result shows, every incentive factor has a changeable effect. However, in the poor rural areas, like Changwu County and Heyang County in Shaanxi province, the incentive effect of wage and promotion or development opportunities are still significant all the time.Thus, we can make a conclusion from the empirical and experimetal results: In the poor rural areas, the incentive policy should focus on the higher cashing rate of wage, a proper increase of wage, widening political promotion opportunities and increasing study chances. Meantime, in the poor rural areas, we should continually strengthen the democratic institution of village governance and the reputation mechanism, build up a better relationship between the village leaders and their villagers, and reduce the village leaders'working stress appropriately.The empirical and experimental analysis results above, could supply a more helpful basis for the incentive direction choosing and incentive intensity design.Finally is the whole conclusion of this dissertation. On one hand, in this part, the author summarized the study results. On another hand, set up a series incentive mechanism to increase the village leader enthusiasm,and design several rules or institutions to make sure that village leaders would supply a better service to their villagers in CNSC. The author believe that this work can carry on some important policy implication to the policy-makers in the rural management field, also some new content in this field, as well as some new perspectives.