Study On Behavior Of Corruption Of State Personnel And Entrepreneur In The Perspective Of Evolutionary Game

Corruption,described as "the cancer of politics",is like a tumor in the body of human society.Corruption will not only lead to a decline of public trust in government,but also affect the normal operation of the entire economy and society.At present,anti-corruption has become the consensus of the whole country and even the entire international community.Various anti-corruption initiatives are taken,but rent-seeking and corruption appear repeatedly.This study is to analyze the rent-seeking and corruption issue in the Perspective of Evolutionary Game.Evolutionary game theory assumes that both parties involved in the game are limited rationality,it is impossible to grasp all the information that influences decision,which is consistent with reality.In the game,participants will strictly calculate their costs and benefits,and selection policy based on the results of the calculation,which is consistent with the forming mechanism of corruption.Previous literature mainly researched on rent-seeking and corruption phenomenon from political,economic,cultural and social perspective.But study on rent-seeking and corruption from one aspect becomes one-sidedness because of its complexness.The traditional game theory is able to integrate various factors,but it assumes that participates are "perfectly rational" which leads to weak practical guidance because the results of the study is not consistent with reality.Using evolutionary game analysis method to study the rent-seeking and corruption can just to make up for this deficiency.Based on the reality of rent-seeking and corruption performance,combined with existing research literature about rent-seeking and corruption,this paper constructs evolutionary game models between national staffs and national staffs as well as government officials and entrepreneurs using evolutionary game analysis method.This paper uses MATLAB software to simulate these two models,to verify influence of the model parameters on the evolution of trends and evolutionary stable strategy.According to the simulation results,we obtained:the evolution of the system among the national staffs as well as between government officials and entrepreneurs is "path dependent".The result depends on the initial state of the evolution process.Rent,corruption profit,corruption costs,the probability investigation to corruption and reporting awards and other factors affect the choice of enterprises and national staffs in the face of rent-seeking and corruption.Evolutionary game between national staffs and national staffs as well as government officials and enterprises is a dynamic process.The evolutionary equilibrium is a dynamic equilibrium.Therefore,in the initial success of anti-corruption,it must not be relaxed in case of a comeback of corruption.We must not slacken our efforts at any time when fighting with the behavior of rent-seeking and corruption.Finally,policy proposals are put forward for the prevention and control of rent-seeking and corruption based on analysis results,such as improving the system of civil servants,establishing and perfecting the market mechanism,improving the system of corruption report,increasing penalties of rent-seeking and corruption,etc.