A Comparative Study Of Crisis Management Of The U.S. In The Post-Cold War Era

Based on relevant theories of international crisis, this study examines the US behavior in two cases: one unsymmetrical-the Gulf Crisis (1990-1991) and the other symmetrical-the North Korea Nuclear Crisis (1993-1994), analyzes why one ended in war and the other in peace, and summarizes the two patterns of crisis management of the US reflected in the two crises.International crisis, commonly regarded as "International Politics in Microcosm", derives from hostile interactions between two (or more) conflicting parties. For an individual state, it is a situation when its highest-level decision makers hold the perception of: a threat to one or more basic values, along with finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. The tension between protection of one's interests and avoidance of war is the basic dilemma crisis managers must resolve in times of crisis. According to realist theories, crisis managers must try to "coerce prudently or accommodate cheaply, or some combination of both" in order to maximize its values in the crisis outcome.As demonstrated by the cases, crisis might be resolved peacefully only when both parties concerned have strong incentives to avoid war, make use of flexible strategies according to major principles of crisis management, and seize the opportunities for doing so. International system structure and the level of weaponry and equipment have strong impact on international crisis although they alone cannot determine the outcome of a crisis. People may have different explanations of the US crisis behavior through the lens of different models of decision-making, but generally speaking, US decision-makers tend to make rational choices in times of crisis, particularly when its significant national interests are at stake.When the US has distinct unsymmetrical advantages in a crisis, its crisis managers are inclined to follow the approach of Coercion and Compellence in crisis management. They are apt to make protection of their interests rather than avoiding war as the first priority. Holding a "zero-sum" logic in mind, they would not offer any inducement and even would refuse to bargain with the enemy, and diplomatic efforts would focus on establishing international coalitions for isolating instead of communicating with its enemy. They would heavily capitalize on coercive means to compel the enemy to comply with its demands. An ultimatum might be issued to increase the urgency of compliance, and if the enemy fails to comply within the time limit, the possibility of resorting to force by the US would be highly increased.Nevertheless, in symmetrical crises like the North Korea nuclear one, the US options would be severely constrained with the policy dilemma of crisis management mentioned above. Therefore, the crisis managers of the US would like to follow the Carrot and Stick approach to manage the crisis, namely, they would do whatever is needed to protect or advance their most important interests. At the same time, however, they have to avoid utilizing options and actions for this purpose that could trigger unwanted escalation of the crisis.It is essential to note that patterns of crisis management are highly context-dependent and influenced by the perceptions of the decision-makers and the conflicting interactions between the parties concerned. Therefore, the symmetry of crisis might be changed in certain degree due to different perceptions and calculations of different crisis managers, and consequently, would cast influence on the choice of crisis management approach.