Font Size: a A A

Research On The Investment, Profit And Incentive Of Enterprise Technology Innovation

Posted on:2004-02-26Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:F Y LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360122482182Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In order to research the reason and the solution of the under-investment in enterprise technology innovation, in this dissertation, based on the former studies and future prospects about it, analysis methods about the optimal investment and profit in enterprise technology innovation under Duopoly and Principal-Agent condition are put forward, then option methods of the new system about enterprise technology innovation under these two conditions are presented. All these methods give a well solution on the big problem—how to settle the relationship between the investment, profit and incentive in enterprise technology innovation. Based on the above mentioned contents, the major research works are listed as follows:1.In this dissertation, it is well proved that profit maximization is the only motive of enterprise technology innovation under Duopoly condition.2.Considering the existence of asymmetric information, it is analyzed and proved that the cost of enterprise technology innovation is the optimal effort level function of deputy, the effort of deputy can reduce the investment and the cycle of enterprise technology innovation. Therefore, the more effort, the fewer investment.3.Concepts of basic investment and benchmark investment about enterprise technology innovation are put forward, and basing these concepts the following theory are researched: with the optimal incentive contract, benchmark investment is smaller than basic investment without incentive contract; it is under-investment when the investment of technology innovation is smaller than benchmark investment, in contrast, it is over-investment.4.Under the condition of the optimal incentive contract, calculation problem about the optimal investment in enterprise technology innovation is solved, and relationship formulations about the investment, profit and incentive of technology innovation in corporative innovation system and imitation innovation under the protection of patent and independent innovation of enterprise are further constructed.5According the study about the effect of technology permission on technology innovation system and social welfare, the option standard of enterprise technology innovation system without technology permission is presented. If the cost reduction of technology innovation is small, enterprise will choose non-cooperative innovation without technology permission. If there is no permission and the cost reduction is also small, the enterprise will choose cooperative innovation.6.In this dissertation, the effect of management incentive on technology innovation system and its option condition are also researched. Different management incentive may induce different option of innovation fashion, and have different effect on market. Cooperative innovation will induce higher investment in technology innovation, lower product price and higher profit than non-cooperative innovation.
Keywords/Search Tags:enterprise, technology innovation, patent protection, under-investment, Duopoly, Principal-Agent
PDF Full Text Request
Related items