Study On Supply Contracts For Perishable Goods Based On The Newsvendor Model

Long lead-times, short sales period, low salvage value and volatile markets etc characterize perishable goods. By adopting theories and methods of Game Theory Operations Research Marketing Science and Industrial Economics, this research studies how the supplier to adopt different strategies to design reasonable terms of Supply Contracts in order to coordinate the relationship between supplier and retailers and to realize the "Win-Win" conditions, even to achieve Supply Chain Coordination in a two-echelon perishable goods supply chain with one supplier and multi-retailers.At first we study the problem how supplier to design the terms of Supply Contracts to maximize its profit based on Target Rebates and Quantity Discounts respectively when retailers are independent to each other and there exists asymmetric information about demand distributions between supplier and retailers. Based on previous literature, we formulate a screening model separately. Then we analyze its properties and put forward solution procedures. Then we assume the demand distributions of retailers are uniform to do numerical study. Numerical results indicate that Quantity Discounts can maximize supplier's expected profit, but it can't coordinate supply chain. Uniting of Classification Management and Target Rebates can increase supplier's expected profit and achieve supply chain coordination.Then we prove that inventory game among symmetry retailers exists a unique pure-strategic Nash Equilibrium given supplier's buy back contract. Buy back contract can coordinate supply chain and allot the whole expected profit between supplier and retailers arbitrarily. Wholesale Price Contract is a special case of buy back contract. It can coordinate the above supply chain, but it can't assign the whole expected profit arbitrarily. Besides it's not the supplier's optimal choice. Experiments study derives these conclusions too. When there exists Price Competition among retailers, Linear Price Discount Sharing and Profit Sharing Contract can't achieve supply chain coordination. But Non-Linear Price Discount Sharing can. When there exists Non-Price Competition among retailers, Buy-Back Contract Revenue-Sharing Contract and Wholesale Price Contract can regulate retailers' sales effort and achieve supply chain coordination. But it can't distribute the whole expected profit arbitrarily. Target Rebates prompt retailers to devote sales effort excessively, so it can't achieve supply chain coordination.When the sales period is divided into two sub-periods and retailers trade their inventories via E-Marketplace according to demand at the end of the first period, we investigate the impact of E-Marketplace to supplier and compare with the traditional supply chain. We point out the impacts depend on peculiarities of perishable goods and characteristics of customers. Experiments study proves the results too.Finally, when E-stores launch a campaign, which E-stores provide a series of figure or text links to put on the Web sites that join in the campaign, E-stores compensate the Web sites according to the sales via the links between Web sites and E-stores, We study how E-stores to design the compensation plans when the Web sites belong to different types, and confirm the compensation plans are reasonable adopted by E-stores now. The conclusions give some strong guidance to E-stores.